In its latest battle with Epic Games, Apple has sought emergency relief from the Ninth Circuit to stay a contempt order issued by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers on April 30, 2025. The district court held Apple in civil contempt for violating a 2021 permanent injunction and imposed additional permanent restrictions on Apple’s App Store conduct. Apple’s motion for a stay raises substantial constitutional and procedural concerns that warrant close scrutiny, and the company has a strong argument that the contempt order went well beyond the scope of the original injunction.
This post examines Apple’s arguments, the governing legal standards, and the likely path the Ninth Circuit will take in reviewing the district court’s expansive contempt ruling.
I. Apple’s Core Challenge: Contempt Order as Substantive Injunction Redress
The original 2021 injunction prohibited Apple from “prohibiting developers from including in their apps and their metadata buttons, external links, or other calls to action that direct customers to purchasing mechanisms, in addition to In-App Purchasing.” It said nothing about commissions, formatting rules, or placement restrictions. Apple argues that the contempt order now imposes six broad new rules, including:
- A ban on charging any commission for purchases made outside the app;
- A prohibition on setting conditions for link style, placement, or language;
- A requirement to allow deep linking and dynamic data sharing; and
- A mandate that all link-related messaging be “neutral.”
Apple claims these new obligations are not clarifications of the original order, but rather new permanent injunctions—imposed without a trial and in violation of Apple’s constitutional rights.
II. Contempt Standards: “Fair Ground of Doubt” and Rule 65(d) Limitations
Under Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554 (2019), civil contempt is inappropriate where there is a “fair ground of doubt” as to whether the conduct violated the injunction. Importantly, courts must apply an “objective reasonableness” standard: if a reasonable person could read the injunction and conclude that the challenged conduct is compliant, contempt is unwarranted.
The contempt order also runs afoul of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), which requires that injunctions “describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” The district court inappropriately incorporated the findings of fact from its 2021 opinion—nearly 180 pages of analysis—as if they were part of the injunction. That approach was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), which emphasized that enjoined parties must be able to know from the face of the injunction exactly what conduct is prohibited.
III. The Zero Commission Mandate: Judicial Ratemaking and a Takings Claim
Apple argues that the district court effectively engaged in judicial ratemaking by setting a commission rate of zero for any purchases made outside the app via an external link. This, Apple contends, is not only unauthorized under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), but also violates the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The California UCL, unlike public utility statutes, does not provide for the judicial imposition of rates. See Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 217–18 (1994). Apple analogizes this to an unconstitutional appropriation of its intellectual property and services, citing Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139 (2021), for the proposition that a permanent deprivation of the right to exclude constitutes a per se taking. Here, Apple maintains that it is being forced to provide access to proprietary platform tools and infrastructure—worth billions—without any compensation.
IV. The Formatting Restrictions: Property Rights and First Amendment Issues
Apple’s second major challenge targets the court’s ban on setting any terms for how links may appear or function. Apple argues that these restrictions infringe its First Amendment rights by compelling it to carry developer speech in objectionable ways, citing Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), which reaffirmed that private platform owners cannot be compelled to carry or accommodate speech they disfavor.
Additionally, the company relies on Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U.S. 685 (2022), to argue that regulating the “time, place, and manner” of speech is not the same as a prohibition. The original injunction said nothing about placement or design—Apple’s interpretation that it could impose non-discriminatory formatting rules (e.g., not placing a rival link in the checkout flow) was at least objectively reasonable.
The deeper implication is that the district court’s order transforms the App Store into a regulated speech zone in which Apple is forbidden to enforce even basic UI standards that govern its platform.
V. Procedural Due Process and the Limits of Civil Contempt
Apple argues that the contempt ruling crosses the line into punitive territory. Civil contempt is meant to coerce compliance or compensate for losses—not to punish past misconduct. International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994), draws a clear line: sanctions must be purgable and aimed at future compliance. But the new rules are both permanent and forward-looking, without any mechanism for Apple to “purge” its contempt.
Moreover, Apple contends that the district court punished it for new conduct—specifically the creation of a post-injunction commission structure and developer UI requirements—that had not been adjudicated at trial and was never found to be unlawful under the UCL. Without a full adversarial hearing, that expansion of liability violates Apple’s due process rights. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
VI. The Beverage Decision and Federal-State Conflict
Apple further argues that its continued enforcement of anti-steering rules cannot now be declared unlawful under the UCL because a California appellate court—after the federal ruling—upheld the same Apple policies in Beverage v. Apple Inc., 101 Cal. App. 5th 736 (2024). The decision rejected the same “unfairness” theory advanced by Epic and directly conflicts with the federal court’s UCL interpretation.
Apple invokes Erie and Rule 60(b)(5), claiming that a federal injunction based on California law cannot be enforced in the face of a binding and contrary state court ruling. Apple asserts that the state courts’ ruling reflects the definitive interpretation of California law and that continuing to enforce the federal judgment would create inequitable outcomes in violation of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
VII. Likelihood of Success and What the Ninth Circuit Might Do
Given the strength of Apple’s procedural and constitutional arguments—particularly those concerning the expansion of the injunction and the imposition of zero-commission mandates—the Ninth Circuit is likely to grant a stay of at least those provisions. The court may agree with Apple that these elements were not “clear and unambiguous” in the original injunction and were imposed without adequate due process.
However, the appellate court may also preserve aspects of the contempt order that are closely tethered to the original anti-steering injunction, especially those designed to ensure developers are able to inform users of outside purchasing options. A split ruling is therefore likely: staying some provisions while allowing enforcement of others that closely track the injunction’s original consumer-choice rationale.
Conclusion
Apple’s emergency motion presents compelling grounds for a partial stay, based on well-developed legal doctrines around contempt, due process, and the limits of injunctive relief. While the ultimate fate of the new App Store rules will turn on the full appeal, Apple’s likelihood of prevailing on core aspects of its challenge—particularly the commission ban—is high. The Ninth Circuit will need to carefully weigh Apple’s rights to control its platform against the public interest in competitive app distribution and informed consumer choice.
By Charles Gideon Korrell
