On November 6, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied Motorola Solutions, Inc.’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to overturn the USPTO’s decision to deinstitute eight inter partes reviews involving Stellar, LLC’s patents. The order in In re Motorola Solutions, Inc., No. 25-134 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2025), reinforces two familiar but increasingly consequential themes in post-Arthrex administrative patent law: first, that institution decisions remain firmly committed to the Director’s discretion and largely insulated from judicial review; and second, that attempts to recast disagreements over discretionary denials as constitutional or APA violations face steep, and often fatal, obstacles.
At bottom, the court held that Motorola had no “clear and indisputable” right to relief, that mandamus could not be used as an end-run around 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), and that neither due process nor the Administrative Procedure Act provided a viable hook for review. The decision underscores how fragile reliance interests can be when they rest on interim agency guidance, and how difficult it remains to obtain appellate review of institution-stage maneuvering at the USPTO.
Background: From Institution to Deinstitution
The dispute arose out of parallel proceedings. Stellar sued Motorola in district court in August 2023, asserting infringement of eight patents. While that litigation was ongoing, Motorola filed two waves of IPR petitions in mid- and late-2024. In each, Motorola submitted a Sotera-style stipulation agreeing not to pursue in district court any invalidity grounds that were raised, or reasonably could have been raised, in the IPRs.
The PTAB initially instituted review on both sets of petitions. Stellar then sought Director Review. While those requests were pending, the policy backdrop shifted. In June 2022, then-Director Vidal had issued interim guidance instructing the Board not to deny institution under Fintiv where a petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation. That guidance expressly stated it would remain in place “until further notice.”
Following the change in presidential administrations, the Acting Director rescinded the Vidal Memorandum in February 2025. Chief Administrative Patent Judge Boalick subsequently issued instructions explaining that the rescission applied to any case where no final institution decision had issued or where rehearing or Director Review remained pending. Sotera stipulations would remain “highly relevant,” but no longer dispositive.
Applying that framework, the Acting Director concluded that the Board had over-weighted Motorola’s stipulations and under-weighted the investment in the parallel district court litigation. She deinstituted the first set of IPRs and, after granting Director Review, deinstituted the second set as well. Motorola’s motions for reconsideration were denied. Motorola then turned to the Federal Circuit, seeking mandamus relief.
The Mandamus Standard and the Barrier of § 314(d)
The Federal Circuit began, as it often does in these cases, by emphasizing that mandamus is a “drastic” remedy reserved for “extraordinary situations.” To obtain relief, a petitioner must show a clear and indisputable right to relief, lack of adequate alternative means, and that issuance of the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.
Those requirements collide head-on with § 314(d), which makes institution decisions “final and nonappealable.” As the court reiterated, Congress committed institution determinations to the Director’s discretion, and mandamus is “ordinarily unavailable” to review such decisions, including discretionary denials under Fintiv and denials issued on reconsideration. While the court has acknowledged narrow exceptions for colorable constitutional claims or certain statutory challenges, it concluded that Motorola’s petition fit neither category.
Due Process: No Property Interest in Interim Guidance
Motorola’s primary constitutional argument was that the Vidal Memorandum created a protected property interest. According to Motorola, the guidance imposed substantive limits on agency discretion and entitled petitioners who filed Sotera stipulations to have their IPR petitions considered without risk of discretionary denial based on parallel litigation.
The court rejected that argument decisively. Drawing on Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, it explained that due process protections attach only where there is a legitimate claim of entitlement, not a unilateral expectation. Where a statute leaves a benefit to agency discretion, no protected property interest arises. Institution of IPR is quintessentially discretionary, a point reinforced by United States v. Arthrex, Inc.
The Vidal Memorandum, the court explained, did not mandate any particular outcome. At most, it instructed the Board not to rely on certain criteria when exercising its discretion, and even that instruction was expressly temporary. That kind of interim procedural guidance did not transform a discretionary benefit into a nondiscretionary entitlement.
The court also rejected Motorola’s attempt to frame its interest as a right to a particular process rather than a particular outcome. Citing Olim v. Wakinekona, the court reiterated that “process is not an end in itself,” and that an expectation of receiving a certain procedure does not, without more, constitute a protected property interest. Motorola’s reliance on the Vidal Memorandum, even if reasonable, was insufficient to establish a due process violation.
Finally, the court found no unfair surprise. Motorola was on notice of Fintiv and the Board’s discretion when it filed its petitions, and the interim guidance expressly warned it could be modified at any time. Even reliance costs incurred in filing the petitions did not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.
The APA Arguments: An End-Run Denied
Motorola also advanced two APA theories. First, it argued that rescinding the Vidal Memorandum amounted to a change in law or policy requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking. Second, it contended that the Acting Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to adequately explain the rescission or account for reliance interests.
The Federal Circuit declined to entertain either argument in the mandamus posture. As to notice and comment, the court noted that an APA challenge in federal district court remained available to Motorola. Mandamus, by contrast, could not be used to vacate specific institution decisions without colliding with § 314(d). Allowing such relief would amount to precisely the sort of end-run around the statute that prior precedent forbids.
The court relied heavily on Mylan Laboratories Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V., which rejected a similar attempt to challenge Fintiv through an ultra vires theory. As in Mylan, Motorola’s arguments ultimately targeted the Director’s discretionary weighing of factors at institution, placing them outside the narrow category of reviewable issues.
The court distinguished Apple Inc. v. Vidal, where it held that § 314(d) did not bar a standalone APA challenge to agency rulemaking practices. Here, Motorola sought relief tethered directly to the institution decisions themselves, placing the case beyond Apple’s reach.
Practical Takeaways
The denial of mandamus in In re Motorola Solutions reinforces several practical lessons for parties navigating parallel PTAB and district court proceedings.
First, Sotera stipulations remain relevant, but they are no longer safe harbors. Even when interim guidance suggests a predictable outcome, that guidance can be rescinded and reweighted, and reliance on it carries real risk.
Second, constitutional framing does not magically unlock appellate review. Absent a genuine deprivation of a protected property interest, due process arguments are unlikely to succeed in this context.
Third, APA challenges to PTO policy shifts may need to proceed in district court and on a forward-looking basis. Attempting to bundle such challenges into mandamus petitions aimed at reversing specific institution decisions is unlikely to succeed.
As Charles Gideon Korrell notes, the decision underscores how institution strategy has become as much about administrative timing and policy volatility as about the merits of patentability. Charles Gideon Korrell believes that sophisticated petitioners must now assume that discretionary frameworks like Fintiv can change midstream and plan accordingly, including by carefully evaluating whether the PTAB forum is essential or merely advantageous. Charles Gideon Korrell also observes that the Federal Circuit continues to send a clear message: institution decisions are the Director’s domain, and the courthouse door remains largely closed at that stage.
The Federal Circuit’s order leaves Motorola where § 314(d) has left many petitioners before it—without appellate recourse, but with a clearer understanding of the boundaries. In the chess match between district courts and the PTAB, the Director still controls the opening move, and mandamus remains a long shot.