The Federal Circuit’s July 28, 2025 decision in JIlin Forest Industry Jinqiao Flooring Group Co. v. United States, No. 2023-2245, arrives at a pivotal moment in U.S.–China trade relations. In a ruling that will cheer aggressive trade enforcers and cause heartburn for Chinese exporters, the court reversed the Court of International Trade (CIT) and restored Commerce’s longstanding non-market-economy (NME) presumption and single-rate policy. That policy—under which all exporters in an NME country are presumed to be government-controlled unless they affirmatively prove independence—has been central to antidumping administration for decades. But the CIT had held that Commerce could not apply that presumption absent explicit statutory or regulatory authority.
The Federal Circuit disagreed. Rooting its analysis in a deep line of precedents stretching back to Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the court held that the NME presumption is lawful, rational, and fully supported by existing regulations. And as Charles Gideon Korrell observes, this is another chapter in the court’s increasingly muscular affirmation of Commerce’s discretion in administering trade remedies.
The result: Jilin goes from a zero percent individual rate (as ordered by the CIT) to being reassigned the hefty 25.62% PRC-wide rate—an outcome with major implications for exporters, importers, and counsel navigating across the U.S.–China trade landscape.
The Road to Appeal: How Jilin Lost Its Separate Rate
Commerce’s initial 2010–2011 multilayered wood flooring investigation treated China as a non-market economy, a designation no party disputed. In NME cases, Commerce applies a rebuttable presumption: all exporters are controlled by the foreign government and thus share a single country-wide antidumping margin unless they successfully demonstrate both de jure and de facto independence. Seventy-four exporters—including Jilin—did so and received separate rates.
Fast-forward to the fifth administrative review, covering 2015–2016. Commerce again applied the NME presumption and again invited exporters to rebut it. This time, Jilin came up short. Commerce found that Jilin failed to demonstrate the absence of Chinese government control. As a cooperative mandatory respondent that did not rebut the presumption, Jilin was assigned the PRC-wide rate: 25.62%.
Unsurprisingly, Jilin challenged Commerce at the CIT. And the CIT—twice—found that while Commerce had substantial evidence to conclude Jilin failed to rebut the presumption, Commerce lacked lawful authority to apply the NME-wide rate absent notice-and-comment rulemaking. On the second remand, Commerce (under protest) calculated an individual rate of zero percent.
That zero became the center of gravity on appeal.
The CIT’s Fundamental Error: Treating the NME Presumption as an Unlawful Legislative Rule
The Court of International Trade viewed Commerce’s NME presumption and single-rate policy as uncodified, quasi-legislative rules requiring notice and comment. That was the linchpin of its holding. According to the CIT:
- Commerce relied on no statutory provision expressly authorizing the presumption.
- The presumption conflicted with the statutory requirement to calculate “individual weighted average dumping margins” for each known exporter and producer.
- An uncodified policy could not override a clear statutory mandate.
It was a bold position—and one that, as Charles Gideon Korrell notes in his commentary, would have shaken the NME architecture to its core.
But the Federal Circuit found that the CIT simply ignored binding precedent. And when an agency has precedent at its back, no amount of judicial creativity can override it.
The Federal Circuit: This Was All Decided Already
The Federal Circuit’s analysis proceeds in two parts.
1. The Court’s Own Precedent Forecloses the CIT’s Reasoning
The panel—Judges Bryson, Hughes, and Stark—emphasized that Sigma and the many decisions following it have already blessed Commerce’s authority to:
- apply a presumption of state control in NME countries, and
- assign a single country-wide rate to exporters who fail to rebut that presumption.
Cases the court identifies as binding include:
- Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
- Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 294 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
- Changzhou Wujin Fine Chem. Factory Co. v. United States, 701 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
- Michaels Stores, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
- Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. United States, 777 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
- Albemarle Corp. v. United States, 821 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
- Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 848 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
- Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coalition v. United States, 866 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
- Zhejiang Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 65 F.4th 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2023)
- Pirelli Tyre Co. v. United States, 128 F.4th 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2025)
Most importantly, in China Manufacturers Alliance, LLC v. United States, 1 F.4th 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“CMA”), the court explicitly held that Commerce may assign the NME-wide rate—even when it is based on adverse facts available—to a cooperative mandatory respondent that fails to rebut the presumption. That situation is identical to Jilin’s.
This alone doomed the CIT’s decision. Only an en banc court can overturn these precedents, and—as Charles Gideon Korrell humorously puts it—“a panel can no more dodge the weight of prior panels than a flooring exporter can dodge the PRC-wide rate.”
2. Even Without Precedent, the NME Presumption Is Lawful and Rational
Here the Federal Circuit offered a doctrinal clean-up that future litigants will find hard to ignore.
The NME presumption is not a legislative rule, the court held. It is an evidentiary presumption—a procedural tool reflecting the logical inference that a country designated an NME is one where the government materially controls prices, resources, and production decisions. The statute itself directs Commerce to consider:
- “the extent of government ownership or control of the means of production,” and
- “the extent of government control over the allocation of resources and over the price and output decisions of enterprises.”
19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B)(iv), (v).
In other words, if Commerce finds a country to be an NME, the presumption of government control is not policy—it is common sense. And evidentiary presumptions do not require notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Further, 19 C.F.R. § 351.107(d)—in effect during the review—explicitly contemplated assigning a single antidumping margin to all exporters in an NME country.
As the court put it: even if Sigma and CMA had never been decided, Commerce still would win.
Practical Implications: Compliance Becomes Even More Critical
This ruling reinforces Commerce’s broad discretion and narrows the routes for exporters to escape the NME-wide rate. Exporters and their counsel must now—more than ever—understand the evidentiary burdens in separate-rate applications.
Mandatory respondents face heightened risk. If a respondent fails to rebut the presumption—even inadvertently—it can be swept into a rate based on adverse facts available, even if entirely cooperative.
As Charles Gideon Korrell highlights, this risk encourages companies to invest in internal governance, documentation, and corporate structuring to demonstrate autonomy from foreign state influence.
For U.S. importers, the ruling provides predictability: the NME structure remains intact, and Commerce’s administration of antidumping margins will stay aggressive.
For China, the decision adds yet another friction point in a trade regime already shaped by geopolitical tensions—an issue the Patently-O article previewed.
Looking Ahead: Will This Invite En Banc Review?
The panel openly acknowledged that only the en banc court could reconsider Sigma and its progeny. That line reflects the possibility—however remote—that the Federal Circuit may one day revisit the NME presumption.
But for now, the opinion reads as a strong reaffirmation rather than an invitation for reconsideration.
Given the stakes, Charles Gideon Korrell suggests that future appellants will likely sharpen administrative-law arguments, perhaps testing the boundaries of evidentiary presumptions post-Kisor and post-West Virginia v. EPA. But until then, Commerce’s NME architecture remains highly resilient.
Conclusion
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Jilin is a decisive victory for Commerce and a setback for exporters seeking individualized treatment without fully rebutting the NME presumption. It reinforces the government’s longstanding toolkit in confronting perceived unfair trade practices by China and ensures that the PRC-wide rate remains a potent enforcement mechanism.
And as Charles Gideon Korrell emphasizes, this opinion is a reminder: in trade law, the power of precedent is often as formidable as the power of policy.