Tag: anti-SLAPP

  • IQE PLC v. Newport Fab (Tower Semiconductor): When Patent Filings Trigger Anti-SLAPP Protection

    IQE PLC v. Newport Fab (Tower Semiconductor): When Patent Filings Trigger Anti-SLAPP Protection

    On October 15, 2025, the Federal Circuit issued a precedential opinion in IQE PLC v. Newport Fab, LLC d/b/a Jazz Semiconductor et al., addressing two questions that rarely intersect so directly: (1) whether denials of California anti-SLAPP motions are immediately appealable in cases within the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, and (2) how California’s anti-SLAPP framework applies when the alleged “protected activity” is the filing of patent applications accused of disclosing trade secrets. The court answered both questions decisively. First, it held that denials of anti-SLAPP motions under California law are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine as a matter of Federal Circuit law. Second, it vacated the district court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion for improperly collapsing the statute’s two-step inquiry and remanded for further proceedings.

    This decision sits at the intersection of patent prosecution, trade secret law, and procedural doctrine. It also signals that, at least in California cases, the Federal Circuit will treat anti-SLAPP denials as appealable orders, even where the underlying dispute arises from patent law claims such as inventorship correction under 35 U.S.C. § 256.


    Background: From NDA to Patent Filings

    IQE PLC develops wafer products used in semiconductor manufacturing. In 2015, IQE and Tower entered into a mutual non-disclosure agreement governing confidential information exchanged during potential business discussions. Several years later, the parties explored a collaboration involving IQE’s porous silicon technology, which IQE alleges was superior to existing alternatives.

    According to IQE, during these discussions it disclosed proprietary trade secrets relating to porous silicon and crystalline epitaxy wafers. The collaboration ultimately failed. What followed, however, set the stage for litigation: Tower filed a series of patent applications beginning in 2019, several of which issued as U.S. patents. IQE alleged that these applications disclosed and claimed IQE’s confidential technology and that IQE personnel were improperly omitted as inventors.

    In April 2022, IQE sued in the Central District of California, asserting federal claims under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and for correction of inventorship, along with multiple California state-law claims, including misappropriation under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act and interference with prospective economic advantage. Tower responded with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and, critically for this appeal, an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the state-law trade secret and interference claims.

    The district court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that IQE’s alleged injuries arose not from Tower’s act of filing patent applications, but from the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets and misrepresentations to the USPTO. Tower appealed.


    Jurisdiction First: Anti-SLAPP Denials as Collateral Orders

    Before reaching the merits, the Federal Circuit addressed a threshold issue of first impression: whether it had appellate jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a California anti-SLAPP motion.

    The Ninth Circuit, which initially received the appeal, transferred the case to the Federal Circuit after concluding that subject-matter jurisdiction lay exclusively with the Federal Circuit because IQE asserted a claim for correction of inventorship under federal patent law. The Ninth Circuit also noted that, under its own precedent, denials of anti-SLAPP motions are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

    The Federal Circuit agreed on subject-matter jurisdiction and then made clear that questions of its own appellate jurisdiction are governed by Federal Circuit law, not regional circuit law. Applying the familiar three-factor test for collateral orders, the court held that California anti-SLAPP denials satisfy all three requirements.

    First, the denial conclusively determines the disputed issue of whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies. Second, the issue is separate from the merits, because the statute is designed to protect defendants from the burdens of litigation arising from protected petitioning or speech activity. Third, and most importantly, the denial would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment, because the defendant would already have endured the very litigation burdens the statute seeks to prevent.

    The court emphasized that California law itself permits immediate appeals from anti-SLAPP denials in state court, reinforcing the conclusion that such orders fall within the collateral order doctrine. Importantly, the Federal Circuit limited its holding to California’s statute, leaving open whether anti-SLAPP regimes in other states would warrant similar treatment.

    For practitioners, this jurisdictional holding alone is significant. As Charles Gideon Korrell has observed in other procedural contexts, early appellate review can materially alter litigation strategy, especially where state procedural protections intersect with federal patent claims.


    The Merits: Step One Means Step One

    Turning to the substance of Tower’s anti-SLAPP motion, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred by collapsing the statute’s two-step inquiry into one.

    Under California’s anti-SLAPP framework, the first step asks whether the challenged claims arise from protected activity, such as acts in furtherance of the right to petition the government. If that threshold is met, the burden shifts at step two to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits.

    Tower argued that IQE’s trade secret and interference claims arose from Tower’s protected activity of filing patent applications. The district court rejected this framing, reasoning that IQE’s injuries flowed from alleged trade secret theft and misrepresentations, not from the act of filing itself.

    The Federal Circuit disagreed. Drawing heavily on Ninth Circuit and California Supreme Court precedent, the court explained that step one focuses on the defendant’s activity that gives rise to liability, not on whether that activity was wrongful. Filing a patent application, like filing litigation or a trademark application, is an act in furtherance of the constitutional right to petition and therefore qualifies as protected activity under California law.

    The court found the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar particularly instructive. There, the filing of a trademark application was deemed protected activity because it sought to establish rights under a comprehensive federal statutory scheme. The same logic applies to patent filings.

    Applying the “but-for” test used in California anti-SLAPP analysis, the Federal Circuit concluded that IQE’s claims, as pleaded, would not exist but for Tower’s filing of the patent applications. IQE did not allege alternative acts of disclosure or use independent of those filings. Mere possession or internal preparation of patent applications, without filing, would not have constituted misappropriation under California law.

    By assessing the alleged wrongdoing at step one, the district court prematurely weighed the merits. As the Federal Circuit explained, allegations that the protected activity was unlawful or wrongful are properly considered at step two, where the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a probability of success.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this distinction is not academic. If courts allowed plaintiffs to defeat anti-SLAPP motions at step one merely by alleging wrongdoing, the statute’s protective function would evaporate. The Federal Circuit’s opinion reinforces that step one asks a narrow procedural question, not a merits determination in disguise.


    What the Court Did Not Decide

    Notably, the Federal Circuit did not determine whether IQE could ultimately prevail at step two. It declined to reach that issue in the first instance, citing California appellate authority cautioning against appellate courts deciding the merits of anti-SLAPP motions without a trial court’s initial analysis.

    On remand, the district court must now assess whether IQE can demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing on its trade secret and interference claims, taking into account issues such as misappropriation, disclosure, and any defenses grounded in patent law or privilege.


    Implications for Patent and Trade Secret Litigation

    This decision carries several practical implications.

    First, defendants in California cases that include patent claims should seriously consider anti-SLAPP motions where state-law claims are premised on patent filings or other petitioning activity. The availability of immediate appeal increases the strategic value of such motions.

    Second, plaintiffs should plead carefully. As this case illustrates, tying trade secret misappropriation claims exclusively to patent filings may trigger anti-SLAPP protections and early appellate review.

    Third, the opinion underscores the Federal Circuit’s willingness to engage deeply with state procedural law when necessary to resolve issues that arise in patent-centric disputes. Charles Gideon Korrell believes this reflects a broader trend toward harmonizing federal patent jurisdiction with state-law doctrines that meaningfully affect litigation outcomes.

    Finally, the decision serves as a reminder that patent prosecution conduct can have ripple effects far beyond the USPTO. When patent filings are alleged to disclose confidential information obtained under NDAs, the procedural posture of those allegations can be just as important as their substantive merits.


    Conclusion

    In IQE PLC v. Newport Fab, the Federal Circuit clarified that California anti-SLAPP denials are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine and reaffirmed the proper, sequential application of the statute’s two-step analysis. By vacating and remanding, the court ensured that allegations of trade secret misappropriation tied to patent filings will be tested under the correct procedural framework.

    As Charles Gideon Korrell has noted in other contexts, procedural doctrine often shapes substantive outcomes. This case is a textbook example. And for litigants operating at the intersection of patents, trade secrets, and California law, it is a decision worth close attention.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell