Technology & Information Law Blog by Charles Gideon Korrell

Tag: CAFC

  • In re: Vetements Group AG — Generic Foreign Terms Cannot Serve as Trademarks

    In re: Vetements Group AG — Generic Foreign Terms Cannot Serve as Trademarks

    In In re: Vetements Group AG, Nos. 2023-2050, -2051 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2025), the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (TTAB) refusal to register “VETEMENTS” as a trademark for clothing and online retail clothing store services. Applying the doctrine of foreign equivalents, the court agreed that “vetements,” the French word for “clothing,” is generic or, at best, merely descriptive of the applicant’s goods and services and lacked acquired distinctiveness. The ruling underscores key limits on registering foreign-language marks that translate into generic English terms.

    Background

    Vetements Group AG sought registration of “VETEMENTS” in both standard and stylized forms for a variety of apparel items and related retail services. The USPTO refused registration under § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, finding the term generic or merely descriptive without secondary meaning. The TTAB affirmed, concluding that consumers would likely translate “vetements” into “clothing,” and would perceive the term as referring to a genus of goods.

    Legal Standards and Application

    The court conducted a de novo review of the Board’s legal determinations and assessed factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. It framed its analysis around several well-established principles:

    1. Generic Terms Are Not Registrable: A generic term “is the ultimate in descriptiveness” and incapable of indicating source. (Bullshine Distillery LLC v. Sazerac Brands, LLC, 130 F.4th 1025, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2025)).
    2. Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents: Foreign terms from modern languages are generally translated into English to assess descriptiveness or genericness. This doctrine applies where the “ordinary American purchaser” would likely “stop and translate” the term. (Palm Bay Imports v. Veuve Clicquot, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
    3. Ordinary American Purchaser: This includes U.S. consumers familiar with the foreign language. Even absent a majority, an “appreciable number” of speakers is sufficient. The Board found over 2 million U.S. residents speak French at home, and French is widely taught in U.S. schools—facts the court deemed substantial evidence.
    4. Context of Use: The court distinguished cases like Palm Bay and Tia Maria, where foreign terms had no logical connection to the goods and thus were unlikely to be translated. By contrast, “vetements” directly describes the goods at issue—clothing—and consumers encountering the term on apparel would likely understand and translate it.

    Notable Precedent

    The court’s decision reaffirmed and applied key precedents:

    Takeaway

    The Federal Circuit reaffirmed that marks comprised of foreign terms will not evade genericness or descriptiveness bars simply by virtue of being in another language. The doctrine of foreign equivalents is not discretionary in such cases; rather, it operates as a consistent threshold inquiry. Where a foreign term clearly describes or generically names the applicant’s goods and would be understood by an appreciable segment of U.S. consumers, registration is foreclosed.

    For brand owners, this decision reinforces the importance of assessing the English meaning and consumer perception of foreign-language marks, particularly in connection with goods or services closely tied to the translated term.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute: Federal Circuit Faults PTAB for Conflating Conception and Reduction to Practice Standards in CRISPR Interference

    Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute: Federal Circuit Faults PTAB for Conflating Conception and Reduction to Practice Standards in CRISPR Interference

    In a closely watched battle over the origins of one of the most transformative technologies in modern biology, the Federal Circuit has partially reversed a PTAB ruling in Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute, Inc., No. 22-1653 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2025). The dispute centers on who first invented the use of CRISPR-Cas9 systems with single-guide RNA (sgRNA) to edit DNA in eukaryotic cells—a breakthrough that has revolutionized gene editing and spurred enormous commercial and scientific interest.

    The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s finding that the Broad Institute had priority over the University of California, University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively, the “Regents”), holding that the Board applied the wrong legal standard for conception. While affirming the PTAB’s determination that the Regents’ provisional applications lacked adequate written description, the Court remanded for further proceedings on conception.

    Background: A Decade-Long Dispute Over CRISPR Dominance

    This interference proceeding is the latest chapter in a long and contentious legal saga between two groups of academic researchers. The Regents’ team, scientists, directed by Emmanuelle Charpentier, Jennifer Doudna, and Martin Jinek, published a seminal 2012 paper demonstrating that a CRISPR-Cas9 system could be programmed using a chimeric sgRNA to cut DNA in a test tube. The Broad team, led by Feng Zhang at MIT and the Broad Institute, was the first to obtain patents for using CRISPR-Cas9 in eukaryotic cells, including human cells, after submitting expedited applications to the USPTO.

    The potential commercial implications of these patents are immense. CRISPR technologies are foundational in developing gene therapies, agricultural tools, and synthetic biology applications. The 2020 Nobel Prize in Chemistry was awarded to Doudna and Charpentier for their discovery, but the patent rights remained under dispute. This case, involving Interference No. 106,115, marks the second interference declared between the parties and focuses specifically on claims involving the use of a single-guide CRISPR-Cas9 system in eukaryotic cells.

    Federal Circuit: PTAB Misapplied the Legal Standard for Conception

    The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB improperly required the Regents’ scientists to know their invention would work in eukaryotic cells in order to establish conception. This, the Court held, conflated the distinct legal standards for conception and reduction to practice.

    Citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the panel emphasized that an inventor need only have a “definite and permanent idea” of the complete invention. Certainty of success or experimental proof is not required at the conception stage.

    The Court also held that:

    • The PTAB placed undue weight on contemporaneous expressions of doubt by the Regents’ scientists, without analyzing whether these doubts led to substantive changes in their design;
    • The Board erred by failing to consider whether others—using the Regents’ published design and routine methods—were able to achieve successful editing in eukaryotic cells, which would support the argument that the invention required only ordinary skill to reduce to practice;
    • The PTAB wrongly disregarded the use of “routine techniques” in the field as a key factor in assessing whether conception had been achieved.

    The Court remanded the case for further findings under the proper legal framework, which will allow the Regents to reargue their priority claim based on their early 2012 planning and public disclosures.

    Written Description: Affirmed Due to Unpredictability in the Field

    The Court affirmed the PTAB’s determination that the Regents’ first (P1) and second (P2) provisional applications lacked adequate written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112. The claims at issue involved an sgRNA-guided CRISPR-Cas9 system functioning in a eukaryotic cell.

    Given the acknowledged unpredictability in adapting prokaryotic systems to eukaryotes, the Court agreed with the PTAB that the P1 application did not sufficiently convey possession of an operative embodiment. The Board reasonably found that the application lacked specific instructions or empirical evidence demonstrating success or feasibility, particularly in light of the complexity of the technology.

    Although the Court reaffirmed that a working example is not required, it found the Regents’ disclosure wanting because it failed to bridge the gap between concept and implementation in eukaryotic systems.

    Broad’s Cross-Appeal: Dismissed as Moot

    Broad’s cross-appeal challenged the PTAB’s construction of “guide RNA” as being limited to a single-molecule configuration. However, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot because the Board had denied Broad’s related motions on independent procedural grounds that Broad did not challenge on appeal. Thus, even if the claim construction were reversed, it would not alter the outcome of those rulings.

    Takeaways

    This decision breathes new life into the Regents’ claims of priority in the eukaryotic CRISPR space and signals the Federal Circuit’s continued insistence on correctly distinguishing between conception and reduction to practice. Some key takeaways:

    • The Court reaffirmed that certainty of success is not required for conception. Inventors need only have a definite and permanent idea of the invention that a person of ordinary skill can reduce to practice.
    • In unpredictable arts like biotechnology, written description demands more. Disclosure must demonstrate possession, not just hypothesis, particularly when transitioning between biological systems.
    • Experimental success by third parties using routine methods is relevant to whether an invention was complete at the time of conception.
    • Procedural missteps can be fatal. Broad’s failure to adequately support its claim construction-based motions before the PTAB rendered its cross-appeal ineffectual.

    As this high-stakes dispute continues to unfold, the next round at the PTAB may prove decisive in determining who truly owns the foundational CRISPR patent rights in eukaryotic systems.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Incyte Corp. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries: Federal Circuit Reverses Preliminary Injunction for Lack of Irreparable Harm

    Incyte Corp. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries: Federal Circuit Reverses Preliminary Injunction for Lack of Irreparable Harm

    In a follow-on decision reinforcing its earlier order, the Federal Circuit in Incyte Corp. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., reversed a preliminary injunction granted by the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The district court had enjoined Sun from launching its FDA-approved drug Leqselvi, a deuterated version of ruxolitinib for treating alopecia areata (AA), based on Incyte’s assertion of U.S. Patent No. 9,662,335. The Federal Circuit found that Incyte failed to establish irreparable harm—a required element for injunctive relief under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008)—rendering the injunction improper.

    Background

    Incyte’s ’335 patent covers deuterated ruxolitinib compounds, and the dispute arose after Sun secured FDA approval in July 2024 to market Leqselvi for AA. Incyte, which is still in early development stages for a topical version of the drug, moved to preliminarily enjoin Sun. The district court granted the motion, primarily crediting Incyte’s argument that Sun’s launch would grant it a “head start” and erode Incyte’s competitive position before its own product could reach the market.

    The Federal Circuit’s Analysis

    Writing for the panel, Chief Judge Moore found the district court’s irreparable harm analysis clearly erroneous. The court underscored that preliminary injunctions require a showing that harm is likely absent an injunction, not merely speculative or inevitable.

    While the Federal Circuit recognized that in some cases a first-mover advantage and loss of “sticky” customer relationships may constitute irreparable harm (Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics Inc., 967 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Natera, Inc. v. NeoGenomics Labs., Inc., 106 F.4th 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2024)), the facts here were materially different. Unlike Natera, where the injunction prevented immediate entry and preserved the patentee’s imminent market position, Incyte’s product is still years away from launch—even under its most optimistic development timeline—and certainly after the ’335 patent’s expiration in December 2026.

    This distinction proved fatal to Incyte’s argument. As the court explained, “[b]ecause Incyte cannot enjoin Sun from launching after its ’335 patent expires, Sun’s multi-year head start is inevitable regardless of any injunction.” Thus, any advantage Sun might gain from launching before Incyte was not attributable to the absence of an injunction, but to the natural expiration of the patent.

    Comparison to Earlier Decision

    This ruling builds on the court’s prior order on April 9, 2025, vacating the injunction without a full opinion. Both decisions underscore a consistent message: patent holders must offer concrete, non-speculative proof of irreparable harm that an injunction can actually prevent. A delay in entry that would happen regardless of judicial intervention—because of patent expiration or the plaintiff’s own development delays—does not suffice.

    Key Takeaways

    1. Inevitable Market Entry Is Not Irreparable Harm: When a competitor’s entry into the market is inevitable post-patent expiration, courts will be reluctant to find that harm from early entry is “irreparable.”
    2. Development Timelines Matter: A patent holder that is years away from commercial launch faces a high hurdle in arguing that it will suffer imminent harm absent an injunction.
    3. First-Mover Advantage Is Contextual: While first-mover advantage can support injunctive relief, it must be tethered to a plausible timeline and preventable disruption.

    This decision reflects the Federal Circuit’s increasing scrutiny of the evidentiary basis for irreparable harm, particularly in the pharmaceutical and biotech space. Litigants seeking preliminary injunctions would be wise to present a realistic commercial timeline and show how the injunction meaningfully alters competitive dynamics within the remaining life of the patent.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Jazz Pharmaceuticals v. Avadel CNS Pharmaceuticals: Clarifying the Limits of Injunctive Relief Under the Hatch-Waxman Safe Harbor

    Jazz Pharmaceuticals v. Avadel CNS Pharmaceuticals: Clarifying the Limits of Injunctive Relief Under the Hatch-Waxman Safe Harbor

    In the recent Federal Circuit decision Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Avadel CNS Pharmaceuticals, LLC, the court provided critical guidance on the limits of injunctive relief relating to FDA submissions and clinical trials under the Hatch-Waxman Act.

    Background and Procedural History

    Jazz Pharmaceuticals manufactures Xywav®, currently the only FDA-approved drug for treating idiopathic hypersomnia (IH). Avadel CNS Pharmaceuticals sought approval of its competing product, Lumryz, for narcolepsy and IH through a paper New Drug Application (NDA) relying partly on data associated with Jazz’s Xyrem®.

    Jazz’s patent infringement lawsuit initially relied on 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), claiming Avadel’s FDA submission infringed its later-issued patent, the ’782 patent. The district court permanently enjoined Avadel from applying for FDA approval or marketing Lumryz for IH, initiating new clinical trials, and offering open-label extensions (OLE) in clinical studies.

    Federal Circuit’s Analysis and Key Holdings

    The Federal Circuit addressed each aspect of the district court’s injunction separately:

    1. Initiating New Clinical Trials: The court unequivocally reversed this portion of the injunction, emphasizing that the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor (§ 271(e)(1)) expressly protects activities solely related to FDA submissions. The court noted that such experimental activities do not constitute infringement and that § 271(e)(3) explicitly bars injunctive relief against these safe-harbor activities. The panel emphasized that no factual development was required here, given the purely legal nature of Avadel’s challenge to this aspect of the injunction.
    2. Offering Open-Label Extensions (OLE): Similarly, the injunction prohibiting Avadel from offering OLE periods to clinical trial participants was reversed. The Federal Circuit clarified that this activity had not been adjudicated to fall outside the protection of the safe harbor, and thus, prematurely enjoining it exceeded statutory limits.
    3. Applying for FDA Approval for New Indications: The court vacated and remanded the injunction barring FDA submissions for new Lumryz indications. While acknowledging FDA submissions themselves do not infringe under § 271(a), the court explored the nuance of artificial infringement under § 271(e)(2). The decision identified unresolved legal questions about whether submitting a paper NDA for a non-Orange Book listed patent constitutes artificial infringement, directing the district court to examine this issue on remand. The Federal Circuit underscored that even if not infringement, an injunction against submitting FDA applications could only stand if clearly necessary to prevent actual infringement—an analysis the lower court had not sufficiently articulated.

    Implications for Patent Litigation and FDA Regulatory Submissions

    This ruling highlights the judicial restraint required in granting injunctions in pharmaceutical patent cases, especially concerning activities explicitly shielded under Hatch-Waxman’s safe harbor provisions. Companies engaged in FDA-related drug development activities can rely on clearer boundaries protecting their clinical research endeavors. Furthermore, the decision signals to district courts that injunctive relief must directly correspond to actual or likely infringing activities and be clearly supported by detailed factual and legal analysis.

    The remand provides further opportunity for nuanced interpretation and application of the Hatch-Waxman Act, particularly regarding the interplay between FDA regulatory submissions and patent infringement litigation, setting important precedent for future cases.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • In re Thomas D. Foster, APC: Trademark Refusal Reinforces Timing and False Connection Analysis Under the Lanham Act

    In re Thomas D. Foster, APC: Trademark Refusal Reinforces Timing and False Connection Analysis Under the Lanham Act

    In a recent decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s refusal to register the trademark “US SPACE FORCE,” emphasizing critical considerations under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act related to false suggestions of a connection. This ruling highlights the significance of timing in trademark analysis and clarifies the factors influencing determinations of false associations with government entities.

    The appeal arose from Thomas D. Foster, APC’s attempt to register “US SPACE FORCE” (Nos. 87839062 and 87981611) following President Trump’s public announcement in March 2018 about creating a new military branch under this name. Shortly thereafter, Foster filed an intent-to-use trademark application. The examining attorney refused registration under § 2(a), alleging the mark falsely suggested a connection with the United States government, a decision subsequently upheld by the TTAB.

    Addressing the critical timing aspect, the Federal Circuit cited Piano Factory Group, Inc. v. Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH, where the court had previously determined that the relevant period for evaluating false connection claims is generally the time of registration. Here, because the matter concerned an application rather than an existing registration, the court clarified that for refusals, the relevant period extends up to the completion of the examination process. Thus, evidence arising during the examination period could properly be considered.

    Applying the four-part test articulated in Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., the court analyzed:

    1. Whether the mark closely approximates the identity previously used by another entity;
    2. Whether it uniquely and unmistakably points to that entity;
    3. Whether the applicant is connected to the named entity; and
    4. Whether the entity’s fame or reputation would cause a presumed connection.

    Foster disputed the TTAB’s findings on the first two prongs, arguing primarily against the consideration of evidence developed after his filing date. However, substantial evidence—including extensive media coverage and official government announcements—demonstrated the public association between the “US SPACE FORCE” mark and the United States government, particularly as the name of an official military branch.

    In affirming the Board’s refusal, the Federal Circuit underscored that Foster’s arguments lacked substance against the compelling evidence that the mark unequivocally pointed to the United States government. This decision aligns with earlier precedent such as In re Geller and Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc., reinforcing robust protections under § 2(a) against trademarks that falsely suggest governmental connections.

    This ruling emphasizes two critical takeaways for practitioners:

    • Timing for evaluating false connection claims in application refusals is comprehensive, extending throughout the examination period.
    • Establishing a false suggestion of a connection involves assessing not only similarity but the public’s recognition and association of the mark with an existing entity.

    Practitioners should remain mindful of these considerations when advising on trademark strategies involving names potentially associated with prominent governmental entities or widely publicized initiatives.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC: Public Availability of Prior Art Software Invalidates Patent Claims

    Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC: Public Availability of Prior Art Software Invalidates Patent Claims

    In a recent decision, Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC, the Federal Circuit upheld a jury’s finding that several claims of IOENGINE’s U.S. Patent Nos. 9,059,969 and 9,774,703 were invalid due to anticipation and obviousness by publicly available prior art. Specifically, the Court affirmed that a software application known as the “Firmware Upgrader,” part of M-Systems’ DiskOnKey System, constituted prior art under the “public use” provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (pre-AIA).

    Background

    IOENGINE’s patents relate to portable devices, such as USB thumb drives, that send communications to network servers upon user interaction. Ingenico challenged the validity of IOENGINE’s patents by demonstrating prior public use of M-Systems’ DiskOnKey System, including its Firmware Upgrader software.

    At trial, Ingenico presented significant circumstantial evidence of the Firmware Upgrader’s public accessibility before the critical date. Evidence included a July 2002 email to M-Systems employees encouraging dissemination of the Firmware Upgrader and associated documentation, a public press release, and archived web pages from which the software could be downloaded.

    Court Analysis and Key Precedents

    The Federal Circuit’s analysis emphasized two important precedents:

    1. Medtronic, Inc. v. Teleflex Innovations S.A.R.L. (2023) clarified that circumstantial evidence is equally persuasive and sufficient compared to direct evidence for proving public use.
    2. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. (3M) v. Chemque, Inc. (2002) was distinguished due to the lack of evidence in 3M demonstrating that samples provided were ever used in a manner fulfilling claim requirements.

    In contrast to 3M, Ingenico demonstrated clear evidence that the Firmware Upgrader software was publicly accessible and encouraged for use, meeting the claims’ criteria once downloaded. Thus, circumstantial evidence was adequate to satisfy the public use requirement.

    Clarification on IPR Estoppel and Jury Instructions

    IOENGINE argued for a new trial, asserting improper jury instructions regarding conception, diligence, public use, and sales offers. It also challenged the district court’s decision allowing Ingenico to rely on prior art under IPR estoppel provisions.

    The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that the jury was properly instructed on the clear and convincing evidence standard and other critical issues. Additionally, the court clarified the scope of IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), holding that estoppel does not extend to grounds involving public use or on-sale bar evidence because these grounds cannot be raised in inter partes review, which is limited to printed publications and patents as prior art.

    Conclusion

    The decision underscores the importance of demonstrating prior art’s public accessibility through circumstantial evidence. Additionally, it offers crucial guidance on the limits of IPR estoppel, affirming that petitioners are free to assert public use and on-sale bars in district court actions despite participating in an IPR. Patent holders and challengers alike must carefully consider the implications of public availability and IPR proceedings in shaping their litigation strategies.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • In re Kostic: Broadened Reissue Claims Rejected Due to Statutory Bar

    In re Kostic: Broadened Reissue Claims Rejected Due to Statutory Bar

    In In re Kostic, the Federal Circuit recently reinforced the statutory bar against broadening reissue applications filed beyond the two-year limit, emphasizing that claims must be construed based on their actual language rather than an inventor’s subjective intent.

    Background:
    Appellants Kostic and Vandevelde sought reissue of U.S. Patent No. 8,494,950, covering methods for buying and selling click-through internet traffic via an intermediary website. Original dependent claim 3 allowed a direct traffic exchange without a trial process but explicitly depended on independent claim 1, which required a trial process. Arguing that original claim 3 was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for inconsistency, appellants attempted to rewrite it in independent form, providing optional pathways either with or without a trial process.

    Federal Circuit Decision:
    The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s rejection, holding the reissue claim was impermissibly broader than the original. The Court applied the principle established in Medtronic, Inc. v. Guidant Corp. that any claim containing at least one conceivable process not infringing the original claims is broader in scope.

    Key Points of Law:

    • Claim Construction: The Court clarified that the determination of claim scope for broadening reissues under 35 U.S.C. § 251(d) depends strictly on the claims as originally written, rather than on the patentees’ intended scope or subjective understanding. Citing Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc. and Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., the Court underscored the importance of objective claim interpretation.
    • Broadened Scope Analysis: Reissue claim 3 introduced optional pathways (with or without a trial process), whereas original claims mandated a trial process. Thus, the reissue claim was broader, capturing methods that would not infringe original claims. Since this broadened claim was sought beyond the two-year statutory limit, it violated 35 U.S.C. § 251(d).

    Implications:
    This decision reiterates the importance of careful drafting and review during patent prosecution. Inventors and practitioners must ensure that dependent claims clearly align with independent claims and avoid ambiguous constructions. Once the two-year period for broadening reissues passes, any attempts to retroactively broaden claims are statutorily barred, emphasizing the critical nature of claim precision at the outset.

    Conclusion:
    In re Kostic serves as a reminder of the rigorous statutory limitations surrounding reissue applications. Patent holders must rely on the explicit language of their claims rather than intentions or interpretations developed post-issuance. Clarity in original claim drafting remains paramount.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Fintiv, Inc. v. PayPal Holdings, Inc.: No Structure, No Claim — Payment Handler Terms Held Indefinite Under § 112 ¶ 6

    Fintiv, Inc. v. PayPal Holdings, Inc.: No Structure, No Claim — Payment Handler Terms Held Indefinite Under § 112 ¶ 6

    In Fintiv, Inc. v. PayPal Holdings, Inc., No. 23-2312 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2025), the Federal Circuit affirmed the Western District of Texas’s ruling that the asserted patent claims were invalid as indefinite. The decision underscores the court’s continued enforcement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 for software-related terms that fail to recite sufficient structure, extending the line of cases exemplified by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

    Background

    Fintiv asserted four patents—U.S. Patent Nos. 9,892,386, 11,120,413, 9,208,488, and 10,438,196—relating to a cloud-based mobile transaction system. At issue were various claims referring to a “payment handler” or “payment handler service” that either (1) used APIs of various payment processors or (2) exposed a common API for interacting with them.

    The district court, applying § 112 ¶ 6, found the payment-handler terms to be means-plus-function limitations and held the claims indefinite for failure to disclose corresponding structure. Fintiv appealed.

    Key Holdings

    1. The Payment Handler Terms Invoke § 112 ¶ 6

    The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the “payment handler” and “payment handler service” terms were functional, lacked sufficient structural meaning, and thus invoked § 112 ¶ 6. Although these terms did not use the word “means,” the court found that the presumption against § 112 ¶ 6 was rebutted under Williamson, which allows application of § 112 ¶ 6 when a term “recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”

    The panel emphasized that:

    • “Handler” is akin to “module,” a term previously found by the court to lack structural significance.
    • Appending the term “payment” did not supply structure but merely described a function.
    • Expert testimony indicated that a person of ordinary skill would not understand how to implement the recited functions based on the claim language alone.

    Fintiv’s reliance on Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2022), was unpersuasive. Unlike Dyfan, where unrebutted expert testimony supported structure, here neither party’s expert testified that “payment handler” connoted a definite structure.

    2. Lack of Corresponding Structure in the Specification

    Once § 112 ¶ 6 was triggered, the court found that the patents failed to disclose any algorithm or adequate structure for the “payment handler” functionality. Merely restating the claimed function—“wrap[ping] APIs” and “expos[ing] a common API”—did not meet the requirement.

    Citing Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v. International Game Technology, 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and Rain Computing, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.3d 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2021), the court reiterated that describing only a general-purpose computer without a specific algorithm is insufficient.

    Fintiv’s attempt to point to a supposed two-step algorithm was rejected as merely a restatement of the claim language. The court also dismissed the idea that the figures in the patents showed a structural implementation of the payment handler, noting a lack of clarity on how the functions were performed or how different APIs were integrated.

    Implications

    This decision adds to the growing body of Federal Circuit case law demanding structural specificity in software patent claims. Key takeaways include:

    • Terms that combine a generic function descriptor with a purpose (e.g., “payment handler”) are increasingly likely to be swept into § 112 ¶ 6 territory if not clearly supported by structural description.
    • Boilerplate specification language that simply mirrors claim terms without detailing implementation will not rescue functional claims.
    • Practitioners should be cautious in relying on software terms like “service,” “module,” or “handler” without anchoring them to known, sufficiently detailed structures or algorithms in the specification.

    Conclusion

    Fintiv v. PayPal reiterates that when it comes to software patents, claiming a function is not enough—patentees must disclose how the function is performed with sufficient specificity. This decision reinforces the Federal Circuit’s post-Williamson trajectory and continues the tightening of indefiniteness doctrine in the software space.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • In re PT Medisafe Technologies: Federal Circuit Affirms Color Mark as Generic

    In re PT Medisafe Technologies: Federal Circuit Affirms Color Mark as Generic

    In In re PT Medisafe Technologies, No. 23-1573 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 2025), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s refusal to register a dark green color mark for medical examination gloves, concluding that the color was generic and not eligible for trademark protection.

    Background

    Medisafe, a manufacturer and distributor of medical gloves, sought to register the color dark green (Pantone 3285 c) as applied to the entire surface of chloroprene examination gloves. The USPTO examining attorney rejected the application, finding the mark generic and lacking acquired distinctiveness. The PTAB affirmed, applying a tailored version of the classic genericness test for color marks.

    Legal Standard

    The Federal Circuit confirmed that the appropriate framework for assessing the genericness of color marks is the two-step inquiry articulated in Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Freud America, Inc., 2019 WL 6522400 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 2, 2019), a slight variation on the test first set out in H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986):

    1. Identify the genus of goods or services at issue;
    2. Determine whether the relevant public primarily perceives the color as a type or category of trade dress for that genus.

    The Federal Circuit formally adopted the Milwaukee test, finding it consistent with Marvin Ginn and well-suited to evaluating color marks under trademark law principles.

    Application to Medisafe’s Mark

    The Board identified the genus as “chloroprene medical examination gloves” and rejected Medisafe’s attempt to limit the genus to sales through “authorized resellers.” Citing In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017), the court affirmed that applicants cannot unilaterally redefine the genus to narrow the inquiry.

    At the second step, the Board concluded that the dark green color was so commonly used for chloroprene gloves across the industry that consumers would perceive it as a standard feature rather than an indicator of source. Supporting evidence included:

    • Screenshots showing numerous third-party sales of similarly colored gloves.
    • Customer declarations that were few, formulaic, and unpersuasive.
    • A customer survey administered by Medisafe’s counsel, deemed flawed due to leading questions, a small respondent pool (only three responses), and lack of expert oversight.

    The PTAB found the cumulative evidence sufficient to show that Medisafe’s color mark was generic.

    Statutory Interpretation: “Generic Name” and Trade Dress

    Medisafe argued that under 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), only “generic names” could be deemed generic, and that a color mark was not a “name.” The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, relying on Sunrise Jewelry Mfg. Corp. v. Fred S.A., 175 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999), which held that “generic name” should be interpreted broadly to encompass trade dress, including colors, that fails to function as a source identifier.

    Burden of Proof

    The court clarified that there is no “clear and convincing evidence” burden on the USPTO to show genericness during ex parte examination. Instead, the examining attorney must make a prima facie case, shifting the burden to the applicant to rebut it, consistent with In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

    Conclusion

    The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding that Medisafe’s dark green color was generic for chloroprene medical examination gloves and therefore ineligible for registration on either the Principal or Supplemental Register. Because the mark was found to be generic, the court did not reach Medisafe’s arguments concerning acquired distinctiveness.

    Key Takeaway: For color marks, the Federal Circuit has now endorsed a tailored two-step genericness test that focuses on whether the color is perceived by consumers as a type or category of trade dress for a genus of goods. Applicants must be prepared to overcome a significant evidentiary hurdle to establish that a color functions as a source indicator, rather than as a generic feature of the product category.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Qualcomm v. Apple: Express Reliance on Applicant Admitted Prior Art Bars IPR Ground

    Qualcomm v. Apple: Express Reliance on Applicant Admitted Prior Art Bars IPR Ground

    In Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc., Nos. 2023-1208, -1209 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 23, 2025), the Federal Circuit reversed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB) post-remand decision, holding that the Board erred in allowing Apple’s inter partes review (IPR) ground to proceed based on a misinterpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). The ruling clarifies the limits on how applicant admitted prior art (AAPA) can be used in IPR petitions and underscores that the “basis” of a ground must consist solely of patents or printed publications.

    Background

    Apple filed two IPR petitions challenging claims of Qualcomm’s U.S. Patent No. 8,063,674, which relates to integrated circuits using multiple power supplies. Each petition included two obviousness grounds under § 103. At issue was “Ground 2,” which relied on AAPA (specifically, Figure 1 and text of the ’674 patent) in view of a published patent application (Majcherczak) and, for some claims, the Matthews patent.

    PTAB originally found Apple’s use of AAPA permissible, treating it as prior art under § 311(b). Qualcomm appealed, and in Qualcomm I, the Federal Circuit held that AAPA is not “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications” and remanded to the Board to determine whether AAPA improperly formed the “basis” of the petition.

    On remand, the Board, applying PTO guidance, adopted an “in combination” rule: AAPA used alongside at least one qualifying patent or printed publication does not form the basis of a ground under § 311(b). It upheld Ground 2 and invalidated the challenged claims.

    The Federal Circuit’s Decision

    Judge Reyna, writing for a unanimous panel, reversed. The court held that:

    1. Reviewability Not Barred by § 314(d): Apple argued that Qualcomm’s challenge was a barred appeal of the PTAB’s institution decision. The court disagreed, finding Qualcomm’s arguments targeted the final written decision, not the institution itself. Citing SAS Inst. v. Iancu and Cuozzo, the court emphasized that § 314(d) does not bar judicial review of questions about how the agency conducts an IPR once it is instituted.
    2. PTAB Misinterpreted § 311(b): The court found the “in combination” rule—allowing AAPA to escape classification as a “basis” when paired with other art—contravened the plain meaning of the statute. AAPA is not a qualifying patent or publication and cannot form any part of the basis of an IPR ground. Reliance on AAPA to supply missing claim limitations may be permissible for obviousness analysis, but not if it constitutes part of the “basis” for the challenge.
    3. Express Statements by Petitioner Are Binding: The court found that Apple’s petitions explicitly labeled Ground 2 as based on “Applicants [sic] Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) in view of” other prior art, thereby violating § 311(b). Because petitioners are masters of their petitions, express characterizations like this are binding. The Board erred in disregarding these express admissions and allowing the ground to proceed.

    Takeaways

    • Express language matters. Petitioners must carefully draft IPR petitions and avoid designating AAPA as part of the “basis” under § 311(b), even if combined with qualifying references.
    • AAPA’s role is limited. While it may be used to demonstrate the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill, AAPA cannot form any part of the legal “basis” for an unpatentability ground under § 311(b).
    • Board discretion is not absolute. Even under the America Invents Act’s streamlined IPR process, statutory boundaries like § 311(b) remain enforceable and reviewable.

    This decision is a key reminder for IPR practitioners: precision in petition drafting is essential, and the statutory language must be honored, even when PTAB or PTO guidance suggests more flexible interpretations.