Technology Information Law Blog by Charles Gideon Korrell

Tag: experts

  • Barry v. DePuy Synthes: The Federal Circuit Draws a Line Between Daubert Gatekeeping and Jury Factfinding

    Barry v. DePuy Synthes: The Federal Circuit Draws a Line Between Daubert Gatekeeping and Jury Factfinding

    On January 20, 2026, the Federal Circuit issued a significant decision clarifying the boundary between judicial gatekeeping under Daubert and the jury’s role as factfinder in patent infringement trials. In Barry v. DePuy Synthes Companies, the court reversed the exclusion of two key experts and vacated a judgment as a matter of law entered after the district court struck that testimony mid-trial. The opinion offers an important reminder that not every tension or inconsistency exposed on cross-examination rises to the level of an admissibility defect—and that Rule 702’s reliability inquiry must not be conflated with the merits of an expert’s conclusions.

    Background and Procedural Posture

    Dr. Mark Barry sued DePuy Synthes entities in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that DePuy induced surgeons to infringe claims of three patents covering spinal derotation techniques used to treat deformities such as scoliosis. The asserted patents describe tools and methods for “en bloc derotation,” allowing surgeons to manipulate multiple vertebrae simultaneously using linked derotation tools.

    Two categories of claims were at issue. The first required tools with a “handle means,” construed by the district court as “a part that is designed especially to be grasped by the hand.” The second, from a later patent, did not require a handle means but instead required cross-linking elements that caused tools to move in unison.

    Barry relied on two experts. His technical expert, Dr. Walid Yassir, opined that DePuy’s accused tools could be assembled and used in infringing configurations that met every claim limitation. His survey expert, Dr. David Neal, designed and administered a surgeon survey to estimate how often the accused tools were used in those infringing configurations, evidence that fed directly into Barry’s damages theory.

    Before trial, the district court denied DePuy’s Daubert motions directed at both experts, concluding that DePuy’s criticisms went to weight rather than admissibility. During trial, however—after both experts testified—the court reversed course. It excluded Dr. Yassir’s testimony on the ground that he contradicted the court’s claim construction of “handle means,” excluded Dr. Neal’s survey as methodologically unreliable, and then granted judgment as a matter of law for DePuy based on the absence of remaining expert evidence.

    Barry appealed.

    The Federal Circuit’s Majority Opinion

    Writing for the majority, Judge Stark reversed across the board. Applying Third Circuit law to the evidentiary rulings, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding both experts and erred in granting JMOL.

    1. Expert Testimony and Claim Construction

    The majority began from a well-established premise: expert testimony that contradicts a court’s claim construction is not helpful to the jury and must be excluded under Rule 702. The court cited Exergen, Liquid Dynamics, and more recent Federal Circuit precedent reiterating that experts may not present infringement opinions “untethered” from the court’s constructions.

    But the key question, according to the majority, was whether Dr. Yassir actually contradicted the construction—or instead merely applied it in a way DePuy disputed.

    The court emphasized that on direct examination, Dr. Yassir repeatedly recited the court’s construction verbatim and testified that he applied it in his analysis. His opinion was that various parts of the accused tools—including when linked together—were “designed especially to be grasped by the hand.”

    On cross-examination, DePuy elicited testimony that it later characterized as contradictory: statements suggesting that “everything” in a linked system could be a handle means, or that parts grasped during assembly could qualify. The district court viewed these statements as redefining “handle means” to include anything that must be grasped, rather than something designed especially to be grasped.

    The Federal Circuit disagreed. In the majority’s view, these exchanges revealed at most a dispute over how broadly the construction should be applied, not a rejection of the construction itself. The majority stressed that the district court’s own Markman order acknowledged that “handle means” could encompass a linked handle array, and that nothing in the construction precluded multiple components from qualifying when linked together.

    Crucially, the court distinguished between contradiction and lack of persuasiveness. An expert who applies the court’s construction in an expansive or aggressive way may be wrong, but that does not render the testimony inadmissible. As the majority put it, disputes over application, credibility, and probative weight are for the jury—not grounds for exclusion.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this portion of the opinion is best read as a warning against converting Daubert into a vehicle for resolving close infringement questions under the guise of reliability.

    2. Survey Evidence and Rule 702

    The court reached a similar conclusion regarding Dr. Neal’s survey. The district court excluded the survey based on concerns about representativeness, non-probability sampling, nonresponse bias, and alleged flaws in question design.

    The majority acknowledged that surveys must examine the proper universe and use a representative sample, but emphasized that methodological imperfections ordinarily go to weight, not admissibility. The court faulted the district court for failing to identify record evidence demonstrating that the alleged flaws rendered the survey unreliable under Rule 702, as opposed to merely vulnerable to cross-examination.

    Importantly, the majority observed that the district court relied largely on its own assessment of general survey principles rather than testimony from DePuy’s own survey expert tying those principles to fatal defects in Neal’s work. The court cited Third Circuit authority cautioning against excluding expert evidence simply because the judge believes the expert’s conclusions are incorrect.

    Here again, Charles Gideon Korrell believes the decision reflects a broader trend at the Federal Circuit: reaffirming that Daubert is a threshold inquiry into reliability, not a substitute for the adversarial process.

    3. Judgment as a Matter of Law

    Because the district court’s JMOL rested entirely on the absence of expert testimony after the exclusions, the Federal Circuit reversed that ruling as well. With both experts reinstated, the case was remanded for a new trial.

    The Dissent and the Rule 702 Amendments

    Judge Prost dissented, grounding her analysis firmly in the 2023 amendments to Rule 702 and the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in EcoFactor v. Google. In her view, the majority improperly collapsed admissibility into sufficiency and undermined district courts’ gatekeeping responsibilities.

    The dissent characterized Dr. Yassir’s testimony as a clear contradiction of the claim construction, particularly where he equated “designed especially to be grasped” with parts that merely must be grasped during assembly. Similarly, Judge Prost viewed Dr. Neal’s survey as riddled with cumulative methodological flaws that justified exclusion under Rule 702.

    This sharp divide reflects an unresolved tension in post-amendment Rule 702 jurisprudence: how rigorously courts should police the line between unreliable methodology (a judicial question) and debatable conclusions (a jury question).

    Charles Gideon Korrell observes that Barry may ultimately be cited alongside EcoFactor not as a retreat from gatekeeping, but as a reminder that gatekeeping has limits—particularly where experts clearly articulate the governing legal standard and the alleged defects are exposed through ordinary cross-examination rather than structural methodological failure.

    Practical Takeaways

    Several lessons emerge from Barry v. DePuy Synthes:

    1. Contradiction requires more than tension. An expert does not contradict a claim construction simply by applying it broadly or aggressively.
    2. Cross-examination matters. Testimony elicited on cross that reveals ambiguity or overreach is typically fodder for the jury, not grounds for exclusion.
    3. Survey flaws must be tied to unreliability. Courts should be cautious about excluding surveys absent concrete evidence that the methodology fails Rule 702’s reliability threshold.
    4. Mid-trial reversals are risky. Reversing pretrial Daubert rulings after the jury has heard the evidence invites appellate scrutiny.

    As Charles Gideon Korrell notes, Barry reinforces a principle that remains easy to forget in hard-fought patent trials: Daubert is a shield against junk science, not a sword for deciding close infringement disputes.

    Conclusion

    Barry v. DePuy Synthes is less about spinal surgery than about trial mechanics. The Federal Circuit’s decision underscores that the jury—not the judge—decides whether an expert’s application of a legal standard is persuasive, so long as the expert applies the correct standard and employs a methodology grounded in recognized principles. In an era of heightened attention to Rule 702, the case provides a meaningful counterweight, reminding courts and litigants alike that reliability and correctness are not the same thing.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Qiagen Sciences, LLC: When “Identical” Means Identical—and the Doctrine of Equivalents Is Not a Jury Mulligan

    Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Qiagen Sciences, LLC: When “Identical” Means Identical—and the Doctrine of Equivalents Is Not a Jury Mulligan

    The Federal Circuit’s decision in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Qiagen Sciences, LLC, No. 23-2350 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 13, 2025), offers a sharp reminder that not every jury verdict survives appellate scrutiny, particularly where infringement theories stretch claim language or rely on generalized expert testimony. In a sweeping reversal, the court vacated a Delaware jury’s willful infringement verdict covering two molecular diagnostics patents and directed entry of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of non-infringement for both. The opinion is a detailed roadmap for litigators navigating claim construction disputes, doctrine-of-equivalents proof, and the limits of “working together” theories of infringement.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes the decision underscores a broader Federal Circuit trend: courts are increasingly unwilling to let juries paper over claim-scope problems or evidentiary gaps with broad narratives about technical similarity or system-level functionality.

    Background: Two Patents, Two Theories, One Jury Verdict

    The patents at issue, U.S. Patent Nos. 10,017,810 and 10,450,597, relate to methods for preparing DNA samples for sequencing using enrichment techniques. Both patents focus on polymerase chain reaction (PCR) workflows employing various primers to selectively amplify regions of interest within a DNA sample.

    Qiagen sold accused kits used in DNA sample preparation. After a five-day trial, the jury found that Qiagen willfully infringed the ’810 patent under the doctrine of equivalents and willfully and literally infringed the ’597 patent. The jury rejected Qiagen’s invalidity defenses and awarded approximately $4.7 million in damages. The district court denied Qiagen’s renewed JMOL motions, and Qiagen appealed.

    On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed across the board, holding that no reasonable jury could have found infringement of either patent on the evidence presented.

    Claim Construction Is a Judicial Function, Not a Jury Question

    The court began with the ’810 patent, which required a “second target-specific primer” having a nucleotide sequence “identical to a second sequencing primer.” Qiagen’s accused primer was 19 nucleotides long, while the referenced sequencing primer was 34 nucleotides long. Labcorp argued that “identical” could include identity to a portion of the sequencing primer, and the district court permitted the jury to decide whether that interpretation was reasonable.

    That was error.

    Relying on O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., the Federal Circuit reiterated that when the parties raise a real dispute over claim scope, it is the court’s job to resolve it. Allowing the jury to decide whether “identical” could mean “identical to a portion” impermissibly delegated claim construction to the factfinder.

    The panel emphasized that the intrinsic record differentiated between sequences that must be “identical” and those that need only be “identical to a portion.” Reading the “portion” modifier into an unmodified term would render other claim language superfluous, violating settled claim construction principles. As the court explained, where the claims and specification use different words to denote different degrees of similarity, courts must give effect to those differences.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this portion of the opinion is particularly valuable for litigators confronting “plain meaning” arguments at trial. Even when courts defer claim construction disputes to trial, unresolved scope disagreements can resurface post-verdict with decisive force.

    Doctrine of Equivalents: Particularized Proof Still Matters

    The jury’s infringement finding for the ’810 patent rested entirely on the doctrine of equivalents. That theory fared no better on appeal.

    Citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. and the Federal Circuit’s more recent decision in VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corp., the panel stressed that equivalence is the exception, not the rule. Proof must be limitation-by-limitation and supported by particularized testimony showing that the accused element performs substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result.

    Labcorp’s evidence fell short on all three prongs.

    Functionally, the claimed “second target-specific primer” was designed to anneal to a known target sequence and increase specificity by enriching target DNA over non-target DNA. Qiagen’s accused primer, by contrast, served to make DNA fragments compatible with sequencing instruments and did not provide target specificity. Labcorp’s own expert conceded that the accused primer did not bind to the native target sequence.

    On “way,” the court found that the accused primer operated differently, binding to a common sequence added during amplification rather than annealing directly to the target region. And on “result,” the accused primer amplified any DNA fragment containing the common sequence, including off-target products, undermining any claim of substantially similar outcomes.

    The court rejected Labcorp’s attempt to aggregate functions across multiple Qiagen primers, explaining that the doctrine of equivalents does not permit a patentee to stitch together the roles of distinct components to satisfy a single claim limitation.

    Charles Gideon Korrell observes that this analysis reinforces a recurring appellate message: generalized testimony that components “work together” will not rescue an equivalence theory where the claim requires a specific element to perform a specific role.

    Literal Infringement of the ’597 Patent: “Target-Specific” Means What It Says

    The Federal Circuit next turned to the ’597 patent, where the jury found literal infringement based on Qiagen’s forward primer (FP) allegedly satisfying the “target-specific primer” limitation.

    The district court relied on testimony that the FP “targets the ligated adaptor” and binds to only a small proportion of molecules in the sample. But the appellate court held that this evidence could not support the verdict under the court’s own claim construction.

    The claim construction required that a target-specific primer anneal to and mediate amplification of the nucleic acid of interest while not annealing to non-target sequences. Qiagen’s FP bound to an artificial adaptor sequence common to all DNA fragments, regardless of whether they contained the target sequence. That adaptor was not itself analyzed and therefore could not constitute the “target nucleic acid.”

    The court rejected the theory that binding to an adaptor attached to a target molecule sufficed. A primer that anneals indiscriminately to adaptor sequences does not become target-specific merely because those adaptors are attached to DNA fragments that happen to contain target regions.

    Nor could Labcorp rely on Qiagen’s gene-specific primers to fill the gap. The claim construction required the target-specific primer itself to perform the requisite functions, not to do so in concert with other primers. Allowing such bootstrapping would improperly rewrite the claim.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this portion of the opinion is especially instructive for cases involving multi-component systems. Courts remain skeptical of infringement theories that rely on collective behavior when claims require individual components to meet defined functional criteria.

    JMOL as a Real Appellate Remedy

    Having found insufficient evidence of infringement for both patents, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL and instructed entry of judgment of non-infringement. The panel did not reach Qiagen’s invalidity or damages arguments.

    For litigators, the case is a reminder that jury verdicts—particularly those grounded in technical complexity—are not immune from rigorous appellate review. Where claim construction errors or evidentiary deficiencies exist, JMOL remains a potent corrective tool.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes Labcorp v. Qiagen fits squarely within a growing line of Federal Circuit decisions emphasizing disciplined claim construction and demanding infringement proof. It also illustrates the court’s continued reluctance to allow the doctrine of equivalents to blur claim boundaries that patentees chose during prosecution.

    Takeaways

    Several practical lessons emerge:

    First, unresolved claim construction disputes are dangerous. Allowing juries to decide the scope of contested terms invites reversal under O2 Micro.

    Second, doctrine-of-equivalents cases live or die on particularized evidence. Broad assertions of similarity, or reliance on system-level cooperation, will not satisfy the function-way-result test.

    Third, for literal infringement, claim limitations apply to individual components as claimed. Courts will not permit patentees to combine multiple accused elements to meet a single limitation absent clear claim language.

    Finally, post-verdict JMOL motions are not mere formalities. When properly preserved, they can reshape the entire outcome on appeal.

    As Charles Gideon Korrell notes, for IP litigators this decision is less about biotechnology and more about fundamentals: words matter, evidence matters, and juries cannot be asked to fix what claims and proof leave undone.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC (En Banc): CAFC Clarifies Daubert Gatekeeping for Patent Damages Experts

    EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC (En Banc): CAFC Clarifies Daubert Gatekeeping for Patent Damages Experts

    In a closely watched en banc decision issued on May 21, 2025, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a new trial on damages in EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 2023-1101. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting expert damages testimony that was not based on sufficient facts or data, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. While the Federal Circuit reinstated the prior panel’s decision on non-damages issues, its en banc ruling significantly clarifies and tightens the standard for admissibility of expert testimony in patent damages cases.

    Background

    EcoFactor sued Google in the Western District of Texas, alleging that Google’s Nest thermostats infringed U.S. Patent No. 8,738,327. The jury found infringement and awarded a $20 million lump-sum damages award based on testimony from EcoFactor’s expert, David Kennedy. Kennedy opined that comparable licenses supported a reasonable royalty of $X per unit and that Google should pay damages on that basis.

    Google challenged the admissibility of Kennedy’s opinion under Daubert, arguing that his damages theory was not based on sufficient facts or reliable methodology. A panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court (with Judge Prost dissenting in part), but the court subsequently granted rehearing en banc to consider whether the trial court complied with Rule 702 and Daubert in admitting Kennedy’s per-unit damages theory.

    The En Banc Holding

    Chief Judge Moore, writing for the majority, reversed the district court and ordered a new trial on damages. The court held that Kennedy’s opinion was inadmissible under Rule 702(b) because it relied on an unsupported factual premise: that three prior licensees (Daikin, Schneider, and Johnson Controls) agreed to a $X per-unit royalty in lump-sum settlements with EcoFactor.

    The court emphasized that Rule 702, especially after its 2023 amendment, requires trial courts to determine whether expert opinions rest on sufficient facts and whether those facts support the conclusions the expert seeks to offer. The court clarified that the judicial gatekeeping function under Daubert is not limited to methodology but extends to whether the factual basis itself is adequately supported by the record.

    Why Kennedy’s Testimony Was Excluded

    Kennedy relied on three license agreements to support his conclusion that a $X per-unit royalty had been accepted by other companies in the market. But the court found:

    • The license agreements expressly stated that the lump sums were not based on unit sales and did not reflect a royalty.
    • The “whereas” clauses recited only EcoFactor’s belief about the $X royalty and did not reflect any agreement or shared understanding with the licensees.
    • Kennedy’s testimony that prior licensees paid $X per unit was not supported by the contracts or any underlying sales data.

    Moreover, EcoFactor’s CEO, Shayan Habib, testified that he lacked access to sales data from the licensees and based his understanding of the lump sums on generalized knowledge of the industry and advice from undisclosed advisors. The court found this insufficient to support Kennedy’s expert conclusions.

    Because Kennedy’s opinion that others paid $X per unit was central to his damages analysis, and because the jury may have relied on that opinion in reaching its verdict, the error was not harmless.

    The Role of the 2023 Amendment to Rule 702

    A key part of the opinion is its reliance on the 2023 amendment to Rule 702, which clarified that courts must determine whether it is “more likely than not” that the proffered expert testimony meets the requirements of the rule. Importantly, the amendment emphasizes that questions of sufficiency of the facts or data are questions of admissibility, not weight. The court explicitly criticized the trend among some trial courts to defer these issues to cross-examination or jury consideration, reaffirming that trial judges must exclude opinions that extend beyond what the expert’s basis and methodology can reliably support.

    Interaction with Appellate Review Standards

    Although not the primary focus of the decision, the ruling has prompted commentary (including from Patently-O) about the Federal Circuit’s application of de novo review to what is ostensibly a discretionary evidentiary ruling. While the court couches its holding as a classic abuse-of-discretion review, its willingness to re-interpret the license agreements and witness testimony may suggest a more searching, fact-driven analysis than the deferential standard traditionally implies.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes that this raises the question of whether the Federal Circuit is re-calibrating its approach to evidentiary rulings in damages cases, especially where expert conclusions turn on contract interpretation or disputed factual premises.

    Reinforcing Precedent on Licensing and Reasonable Royalties

    The decision is rooted in long-standing precedent regarding the use of license agreements in reasonable royalty calculations:

    EcoFactor builds on this line of cases by reinforcing that a reasonable royalty analysis must be grounded in actual, verifiable facts and that experts cannot rely on implied or asserted beliefs absent factual substantiation.

    Broader Implications: Is the Remedies Remedy Now Complete?

    Charles Gideon Korrell sees that the Federal Circuit’s en banc ruling sends a clear message: damages experts must tie their opinions to the factual record in a way that satisfies Rule 702’s admissibility standard—not just survive cross-examination. This decision may mark the culmination of a doctrinal tightening that began over a decade ago.

    If LaserDynamics began the process and Apple v. Motorola accelerated it, the en banc EcoFactor ruling may indeed represent the near-completion of the “remedies remedy”—a recalibration of how courts scrutinize damages theories in patent litigation.

    Experts must now be prepared not only to explain their methodologies but also to demonstrate a verifiable factual foundation for the inputs to their calculations. When the basis for a per-unit royalty is a prior license, courts will require clear evidence that the license actually reflects such a royalty—not just that a party believes it does.

    Final Thoughts

    While the decision is nominally about one expert’s flawed opinion, Charles Gideon Korrell believes that it carries broader implications for how trial courts are expected to apply Rule 702. The Federal Circuit has reinforced that trial judges must actively police the admissibility of expert testimony, particularly in patent damages cases where technical complexity and legal ambiguity often converge.

    Going forward, Charles Gideon Korrell believes that litigants should expect closer scrutiny of any damages theory that relies on settlement agreements or implied royalty rates—and should be ready to defend the factual integrity of those theories from the outset.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Sierra Wireless v. Sisvel: (Dis)Qualification of Expert Witnesses in the PTAB

    Sierra Wireless v. Sisvel: (Dis)Qualification of Expert Witnesses in the PTAB

    In its March 10, 2025 decision in Sierra Wireless, ULC v. Sisvel S.p.A., the Federal Circuit vacated a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) decision due, in part, to the improper reliance on an expert witness who was not shown to possess the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA). For patent litigators and practitioners navigating IPR proceedings, the court’s analysis serves as a reminder of the evidentiary standards governing expert testimony.

    Background

    Sisvel’s U.S. Patent No. 7,869,396 covers an ARQ method in wireless communications. The appellants—Sierra Wireless, Honeywell, and Telit Cinterion—challenged all claims in IPR, asserting anticipation and obviousness based on a prior international application (“Sachs”).

    The PTAB held the independent claims (1, 2, and 6–8) unpatentable but upheld the dependent claims (3–5, 9, 10). Both parties appealed. On appeal, the Federal Circuit took particular issue with how the Board assessed expert testimony from Sisvel’s declarant, Regis Bates.

    Expert Qualifications: The Core of the Dispute

    Appellants argued the PTAB improperly relied on Bates’ declarations despite his failure to meet the Board’s own definition of a POSITA. Specifically, the Board had defined a POSITA as someone with:

    • A degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, and
    • At least three years of relevant industry or research experience in wireless radio systems for data transmission and retransmission.

    Bates lacked a technical degree and had no clear experience designing transmission/retransmission methods in cellular networks. Nonetheless, his testimony was repeatedly cited by the Board in support of its obviousness and anticipation findings.

    The Federal Circuit agreed with the appellants, citing Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2022), to reaffirm that a witness must possess at least the ordinary skill in the art to opine on claim construction, anticipation, and obviousness. The Board’s reliance on Bates, without addressing whether his decades of telecommunications experience could substitute for formal qualifications, was deemed an abuse of discretion.

    Practical Takeaways

    • POSITA matters: A witness’s qualifications must align with the Board’s (or court’s) definition of a skilled artisan. Practitioners should be prepared to establish this alignment explicitly—especially in PTAB proceedings, where the evidentiary record is often limited to declarations and cross-examination.
    • Challenge early and clearly: Raise challenges to expert qualifications as early as possible. In this case, the issue was preserved and ultimately reversed a PTAB finding.
    • Substance over longevity: Even decades of experience in a general field may not suffice if it doesn’t map to the specific technical area required under the POSITA standard.

    Final Thoughts

    As patent practitioners continue to leverage expert declarations in IPRs and litigation, Sierra Wireless underscores the importance of tightly linking an expert’s credentials to the POSITA definition. Courts will not hesitate to vacate Board decisions that rest on testimony from unqualified experts—regardless of the expert’s experience or the PTAB’s apparent confidence.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Court Upholds Limited Damages in Bitmanagement Software GmbH v. United States: Key Takeaways on Copyright Infringement and Licensing

    On January 7, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Bitmanagement Software GmbH v. United States, affirming a damages award of $154,400 for copyright infringement by the U.S. Navy. The case centered around the Navy’s unauthorized copying and use of Bitmanagement’s 3D rendering software, BS Contact Geo, raising significant issues in copyright law, licensing agreements, and damages calculations.

    Background of the Case

    Bitmanagement, a German software company, initially licensed BS Contact Geo to the Navy in 2008 through seat licenses, which restricted installation to specific computers. In 2012, the parties transitioned to a floating license model, which allowed broader access but required monitoring software (Flexera) to enforce concurrent usage limits. However, the Navy later installed the software on over 429,000 computers without ensuring compliance with the agreed usage restrictions.

    After discovering this breach, Bitmanagement sued the U.S. government for copyright infringement in 2016, leading to a complex litigation over the scope of the Navy’s license and the appropriate damages for the unauthorized copying.

    Major Legal Issues Addressed

    1. Implied License and Copyright Infringement

    One of the core disputes was whether the Navy’s actions constituted copyright infringement or were covered by an implied license. The Court of Federal Claims initially ruled in favor of the Navy, holding that an implied license existed. However, on appeal, the Federal Circuit clarified that while an implied license was granted, it was conditioned on the use of Flexera to track and limit concurrent use. Since the Navy failed to implement this safeguard, its conduct amounted to copyright infringement.

    2. Method of Calculating Damages

    A crucial issue in the case was the method for calculating damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), which governs copyright infringement claims against the U.S. government. Bitmanagement argued that it should be compensated based on a per-copy basis, amounting to approximately $85.9 million, as the Navy had installed the software on 429,567 computers.

    The Court, however, applied the Gaylord v. United States precedent, which mandates that damages in such cases should reflect a hypothetical negotiation at the time of the infringement. The Court reasoned that because Bitmanagement had previously agreed to floating licenses—where charges were based on concurrent users rather than installations—the hypothetical negotiation would have led to a license fee based on usage rather than per-copy sales.

    3. Burden of Proof on Usage

    The ruling also addressed the burden of proof regarding the Navy’s actual use of the software. The Federal Circuit held that, as the party that breached the licensing agreement, the Navy bore the burden of proving its actual software usage. However, the Court found that Bitmanagement had not sufficiently challenged the government’s usage estimates and did not provide alternative damages calculations.

    4. Admissibility of Expert Testimony

    Bitmanagement challenged the admission of testimony from the government’s expert, David Kennedy, who estimated damages based on Navy usage data. The Court upheld his testimony, finding it credible and aligned with standard methodologies for determining copyright damages in government infringement cases.

    Implications for Intellectual Property and Government Licensing

    1. Importance of Clear Licensing Terms

    This case underscores the importance of well-defined licensing agreements, particularly for software providers dealing with government entities. The failure to enforce explicit monitoring and usage restrictions allowed the Navy to argue for a more limited interpretation of damages.

    2. Challenges in Proving Damages

    The decision highlights the difficulties in proving damages for software infringement, especially when a floating license model is involved. Companies should maintain detailed records of negotiations and enforce monitoring mechanisms to strengthen potential claims in litigation.

    3. Limits on Government Copyright Liability

    Under Gaylord, the Court reaffirmed that copyright damages against the government are limited to “reasonable and entire compensation,” which does not necessarily equate to commercial licensing rates in the private sector. This means companies contracting with the government should anticipate that damages may be awarded based on actual use rather than theoretical maximum exposure.

    Conclusion

    The Federal Circuit’s decision in Bitmanagement Software GmbH v. United States sets a precedent for how copyright damages are calculated in government infringement cases. By affirming a relatively modest damages award, the Court reinforced the principle that compensation should reflect a reasonable licensing negotiation rather than punitive measures. For intellectual property owners, the ruling serves as a reminder to establish clear contractual safeguards and proactively enforce licensing terms to avoid disputes over implied use and damages calculations.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Keeping Patent Damages Expert Opinions In Check

    The Federal Circuit has taken the unusual step of granting en banc review in EcoFactor Inc. v. Google LLC to address fundamental questions about patent damages. The order vacates the previous decision and calls for new briefing on whether the district court properly applied Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in its allowance of testimony from EcoFactor’s damages expert. This is the first time since 2018 that the Federal Circuit has taken an en banc case involving a utility patent.

    The dispute centers on testimony from EcoFactor’s damages expert, David Kennedy. Google was found by a jury to infringe EcoFactor’s patent related to smart thermostat technology. Mr. Kennedy opined that Google should pay a specific per-unit royalty rate for infringement, a rate spelled out in three license agreements between EcoFactor and three other companies. Each agreement contained a “whereas” clause stating that EcoFactor “believes” that the royalty payment was based on a particular per-unit rate, and the operative provisions of the agreements explicitly stated that the payment is not based upon sales and does not reflect or constitute a lump sum. Despite these arguably contradictory provisions, and without analyzing any underlying sales data or documentation showing how the lump sums were calculated, Mr. Kennedy testified that the licenses reflected an agreed-upon per-unit license rate applicable to Google.

    Google challenged this methodology.  Google argues that the royalty rate does not reflect the value of the asserted patent but instead reflects the value of EcoFactor’s entire portfolio. The licenses included all of EcoFactor’s patents and patent applications. Google further argues that the expert failed to properly apportion the royalty rate to just the asserted patent.

    EcoFactor argues that the case is a poor candidate for en banc review, and that the majority properly applied the deferential standard of review to find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the damages opinion. EcoFactor argues that the per-unit royalty rate is spelled out in three different arms-length patent license agreements. EcoFactor further argues that the agreements settled infringement allegations involving comparable patents against specific smart thermostat features, making them sufficiently comparable to the case at bar. EcoFactor argues that Mr. Kennedy did apportion between the asserted and non-asserted patents.

    The Federal Circuit’s decision in this case is likely to have some impact on the way damages are calculated in patent cases in the future. The court is being asked to clarify when damages theories “cross the line” from permissible approximation to unreliable speculation. The court has requested briefing limited to the narrow issue of the admissibility of the expert’s testimony. However, the amicus briefs raise broader policy issues. The briefs in support of Google or a neutral position emphasize:

    • the importance of rigorous application of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and *Daubert* to ensure that only reliable and relevant expert testimony is presented.
    • the need for damages experts to appropriately apportion the value of the patented technology.
    • concerns about “royalty stacking,” where combined royalties on a product could exceed the product’s total value.

    The briefs highlight a fundamental tension in patent damages: while estimation is inherent in the hypothetical negotiation framework, that framework must be grounded in the analysis of prior licenses and sound economic reasoning. They urge the court to balance the need for flexibility while ensuring reliability and ensuring fair compensation for the patent holder. Ultimately, the decision will likely shape how courts evaluate the use of prior licenses in damages, particularly in the context of patent portfolios.

    Case History:

    • EcoFactor initially sued Google over Nest thermostats in the Western District of Texas.
    • The case went to trial and a jury found Google liable for infringement. The jury awarded EcoFactor \$20 million in damages.
    • Google appealed the judgment, arguing in part that EcoFactor’s damages expert opinion was based on an unreliable methodology.
    • A panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that the expert opinion was admissible.
    • Google petitioned for en banc rehearing, and the full court granted the petition limited to the issue of the damages expert testimony.

    What’s next…

    • Google’s opening brief is due 45 days from September 25, 2024.
    • Amicus briefs supporting Google are due 14 days after service of Google’s opening brief.
    • Amicus briefs supporting EcoFactor are due 14 days after service of EcoFactor’s response brief.

    Issues to watch for:

    • How will the court balance the need for flexibility in damages calculations with the requirement of reliability?
    • Will the court adopt a more stringent standard for the admissibility of damages expert testimony?
    • What guidance will the court provide on the use of prior licenses in calculating damages?
    • How will the decision impact the calculation of damages in cases involving patent portfolios?

    This case is being closely watched by patent practitioners and academics, as it could have a significant impact on patent damages law. The outcome is likely to have implications for both patent holders and accused infringers.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • ParkerVision v. Qualcomm: Collateral Estoppel and Expert Exclusion in Patent Litigation

    ParkerVision v. Qualcomm: Collateral Estoppel and Expert Exclusion in Patent Litigation

    After more than a decade of litigation between ParkerVision and Qualcomm, the Federal Circuit has vacated summary judgment of non-infringement and reversed key Daubert rulings that had hobbled ParkerVision’s case. The court’s decision in ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., Nos. 2022-1755, 2024-2221 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2024), sheds new light on the proper application of collateral estoppel in repeat patent litigation, especially when dealing with related but non-identical patent claims, and on the standards for excluding expert testimony at summary judgment.

    A Litigation Timeline Over a Decade Long

    The saga began in 2011 when ParkerVision sued Qualcomm over its “down-converting” wireless technology. In ParkerVision I, the Federal Circuit affirmed JMOL of non-infringement, largely based on the construction and application of a “generating limitation” found in representative claim 23 of U.S. Patent No. 6,061,551, which required the generation of a down-converted signal from energy transferred into a storage device (e.g., a capacitor).

    In 2014, while post-trial motions were pending in the first case, ParkerVision filed a second action—this time asserting different, albeit related, patents. At issue were two patents: U.S. Patent No. 7,218,907 (related to down-conversion, like the earlier ’551 patent) and U.S. Patent No. 6,091,940 (which includes both down-conversion and up-conversion claims). The parties agreed the accused products remained materially the same, but disagreed about whether the new claims raised the same infringement issue litigated in the 2011 action.

    Collateral Estoppel: Not a Shortcut Without Claim Construction

    The district court had granted Qualcomm’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that collateral estoppel barred ParkerVision from re-litigating the infringement question. But the Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court erred by failing to conduct proper claim construction under Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Instead, the court had relied on Qualcomm’s expert reports and found them “unrebutted.”

    The Federal Circuit emphasized that collateral estoppel applies only if the “issue at stake” is identical. Citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 327 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003), and Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the court stressed that claim construction differences matter, particularly in patent cases. Here, the newly asserted receiver claims lacked the “generating limitation” that doomed ParkerVision’s case in 2011.

    Importantly, the court noted that ParkerVision’s experts offered evidence that the accused products performed down-conversion before energy storage in a capacitor—precisely what the earlier claims precluded, but what these new claims arguably allow.

    Estoppel from IPRs? Not So Fast

    The decision also clarifies the limited preclusive effect of IPR outcomes. In an earlier IPR, Qualcomm successfully invalidated the apparatus claims of the ’940 patent, but not the method claims. The district court excluded ParkerVision’s validity expert based on estoppel from ParkerVision II, 903 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

    The Federal Circuit reversed. It held that because the IPR and appeal had involved a lower standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) than that required in district court (clear and convincing evidence), collateral estoppel did not apply. This aligns with B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138 (2015), and Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), which reject estoppel where differing legal standards apply.

    Expert Testimony: The Threshold for Reliability

    Finally, the court reversed the exclusion of ParkerVision’s infringement experts, holding that the district court abused its discretion by requiring independent simulations or testing as a precondition to admissibility. ParkerVision’s experts had relied on schematics and technical documentation—materials that Qualcomm’s own engineer acknowledged were sufficient to assess how the accused products worked.

    Citing Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the court reiterated that disputes over expert methodology go to weight, not admissibility, especially when the expert relies on materials typically used in the field.

    What This Means Going Forward

    This decision underscores the need for precision when invoking collateral estoppel in patent cases—especially in repeat litigations involving related but distinct patents. Courts must analyze the actual claim language and conduct proper claim construction, rather than infer equivalence based on superficial similarities or expert declarations. It also reinforces that evidentiary exclusions under Daubert must be carefully tethered to the reliability of the expert’s method, not simply the absence of certain types of analysis.

    The ParkerVision–Qualcomm battle continues, now with a renewed opportunity for ParkerVision to pursue its claims in district court. For practitioners, the ruling is a reminder that even long-running disputes deserve fresh analysis when new claims are at stake.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Osseo Imaging v. Planmeca: Rejection of Temporal Limitation on Expert Qualifications

    Osseo Imaging v. Planmeca: Rejection of Temporal Limitation on Expert Qualifications

    In its September 2024 decision in Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the standard for expert qualifications in patent cases, declining to impose a temporal requirement that an expert possess ordinary skill in the art as of the time of invention. The ruling has notable implications for litigation strategy, particularly concerning expert testimony on infringement and validity.

    Background

    Osseo Imaging accused Planmeca of infringing three patents—U.S. Patent Nos. 6,381,301, 6,944,262, and 8,498,374—related to orthopedic imaging systems that create densitometric and tomographic models. Following a jury trial, the District of Delaware entered judgment upholding the jury’s findings of infringement and nonobviousness. On appeal, Planmeca challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, centering its arguments on the qualifications of Osseo’s expert, Dr. Omid Kia.

    Key Issue: Timing of Expert’s Qualification as POSITA

    Planmeca argued that Dr. Kia could not offer substantial evidence on infringement or validity because he did not possess the requisite level of skill in diagnostic imaging in 1999, the patents’ alleged priority date. The Federal Circuit, however, rejected this argument, emphasizing that the governing standard—set forth in Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2022)—requires only that an expert possess the ordinary level of skill in the art, not that such skill must have been attained by the date of invention.

    The Court underscored that Kyocera does not impose a temporal requirement, and it declined to infer one. It reasoned that an expert can acquire the necessary skill later and still reliably opine from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill at the relevant time. The Court further noted that Planmeca had not filed a Daubert motion or otherwise timely challenged Dr. Kia’s qualifications at trial, weakening its post-verdict objections.

    Substantial Evidence of Infringement

    Planmeca also challenged the jury’s infringement verdict on several claim limitations, including densitometry, tomographic modeling, and comparing digital models. The Federal Circuit upheld the verdict, finding substantial evidence for each element:

    • Densitometry: The Court found that the accused systems’ calculation of Hounsfield Units (HU) constituted “quantitatively calculated bone density” under the court’s claim construction.
    • Tomographic Model: Dr. Kia’s testimony supported that the systems merged data from multiple tomographic scans, satisfying the claim limitation.
    • Comparing Models: The Court rejected Planmeca’s contention that a human, not the computer, must perform the comparison. It held that presenting models in a way that enables comparison—such as side-by-side alignment—was sufficient.

    Obviousness: Competing Expert Testimony

    As for validity, Planmeca contended that the asserted claims were obvious over a combination of prior art references, including Guenther, Mazess, Fontevraud, and DIMAXIS. However, the Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s nonobviousness verdict. Dr. Kia testified that combining tomosynthesis (Guenther) with densitometric techniques (Mazess and Fontevraud) would not have been obvious due to the incompatibility between these imaging methods. The Court declined to reweigh the expert testimony or second-guess the jury’s credibility determinations.

    Takeaways

    • No Time-of-Invention Requirement for Expert Qualification: This decision reaffirms that an expert need only possess the requisite skill in the art—when they acquired it is immaterial for purposes of testifying from the perspective of a POSITA.
    • Preservation Matters: The failure to timely challenge expert qualifications under Daubert or through trial objections may limit avenues for appeal.
    • Substantial Evidence Standard Remains Robust: The Federal Circuit continues to defer to jury verdicts where the record reflects a reasonable basis for the findings, even in the face of competing expert testimony.

    This decision serves as a reminder to focus early on expert qualification issues and underscores the importance of building a complete record—both for and against infringement and validity—at trial.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell