Technology & Information Law Blog by Charles Gideon Korrell

Tag: jury

  • Ollnova v. ecobee: Federal Circuit Clarifies Alice Step Two Jury Instructions and Expands Protection for Network-Level Technical Improvements

    Ollnova v. ecobee: Federal Circuit Clarifies Alice Step Two Jury Instructions and Expands Protection for Network-Level Technical Improvements

    The Federal Circuit’s decision in Ollnova Technologies Ltd. v. ecobee Technologies ULC , Case No. 25-1045 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 4, 2026 ), delivers several significant holdings for patent litigators and technology companies. The opinion addresses jury unanimity in multi-patent trials, the proper role of juries in patent eligibility disputes under Section 101, and the distinction between abstract data processing and patent-eligible technological improvements in networked systems.

    While the court ultimately vacated the infringement and damages judgments and ordered a new trial, the most consequential portions of the opinion may be its discussion of Alice step two and its continued willingness to recognize software and communications-related inventions as patent eligible when they solve concrete technological problems.

    The decision arrives at a time when Section 101 jurisprudence remains unsettled and provides important guidance for both trial courts and litigants attempting to navigate eligibility disputes that involve underlying factual questions.

    Background of the Dispute

    Ollnova asserted four patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 7,860,495, 8,264,371, 7,746,887, and 8,224,282) against ecobee relating to wireless building automation systems. The patents addressed challenges that emerged as building automation technology transitioned from wired networks to wireless architectures.

    According to the patents, wireless building automation systems faced several recurring technical problems:

    • Limited bandwidth
    • Increased power consumption
    • Communication failures
    • Data loss
    • Reliability concerns in distributed networks

    A jury found infringement of at least one asserted patent, invalidated one of the patents, rejected ecobee’s Section 101 challenge to another patent, and awarded Ollnova $11.5 million in lump-sum damages.

    On appeal, ecobee challenged nearly every major aspect of the verdict.

    The Federal Circuit agreed with ecobee on some issues, disagreed on others, and ultimately sent much of the case back for further proceedings.

    The Verdict Form Problem: Optis Strikes Again

    Perhaps the easiest issue for the Federal Circuit was the verdict form.

    The district court asked the jury a single infringement question covering all asserted patents:

    Did ecobee infringe any asserted claim of any asserted patent?

    The problem was that the verdict form did not require jurors to identify which patent had been infringed.

    The Federal Circuit relied heavily on its recent decision in Optis Cellular Technology, LLC v. Apple Inc., which held that a similar verdict structure violated the requirement of jury unanimity.

    The concern is straightforward. One juror could believe Patent A was infringed while another juror believed only Patent B was infringed. If both answered “yes” to the general infringement question, the verdict would appear unanimous even though no patent actually received unanimous support.

    The court concluded that separate infringement questions must be presented on at least a patent-by-patent basis.

    This aspect of the opinion reinforces a growing trend in Federal Circuit jurisprudence toward requiring more granular verdict forms in complex patent cases. Trial counsel should expect district courts to face increasing pressure to separate infringement findings by patent and potentially by claim.

    Because the infringement verdict was vacated, the $11.5 million damages award necessarily fell with it.

    A Significant New Development in Alice Step Two Procedure

    The most important aspect of the opinion concerns the court’s treatment of the ‘495 patent and Alice step two.

    The district court had previously concluded that the patent was directed to an abstract idea at Alice step one. Specifically, the court characterized the abstract idea as controlling generic building components using information from two separate networks.

    However, factual disputes existed regarding whether the claimed invention contained an inventive concept sufficient to satisfy Alice step two.

    Those factual disputes were submitted to the jury.

    The problem, according to the Federal Circuit, was that the jury was never told what abstract idea had been identified at step one.

    Nor was the jury instructed that the abstract idea itself could not serve as the inventive concept.

    The court viewed this as a fundamental flaw.

    Relying heavily on Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus, BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Trading Technologies, ChargePoint, and Bascom, the court emphasized that Alice step two necessarily asks:

    “What else is there in the claims beyond the abstract idea?”

    Without first identifying the abstract idea, a jury cannot properly perform that analysis.

    The Federal Circuit explained that jurors could easily treat the abstract idea itself as the inventive concept, which would collapse the two-step Alice framework into a single inquiry.

    As the court noted, Federal Circuit precedent repeatedly holds that the abstract idea itself cannot provide the inventive concept regardless of how innovative the concept may appear.

    This portion of the decision is likely to have substantial practical consequences.

    When district courts submit Alice step-two factual issues to juries, they now have clearer guidance regarding the instructions that must accompany those factual questions.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that the opinion may create a new area of appellate scrutiny in Section 101 cases. Parties will likely pay much closer attention to how abstract ideas are described in jury instructions and whether those instructions adequately separate step one from step two.

    No JMOL on the ‘495 Patent

    Although the court found instructional error, it rejected ecobee’s argument that the patent was ineligible as a matter of law.

    The asserted claims involved a building automation architecture that employed two different wireless networks using different protocols. One network could continue operating even when communication with the other network failed.

    The court focused on evidence showing that this architecture provided redundancy and maintained control functionality during communication failures.

    Importantly, the court relied on Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., which recognized that a technological architecture solving a technological problem can provide the inventive concept necessary under Alice step two.

    The court found sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s determination that the dual-network architecture was not well-understood, routine, or conventional.

    As a result, ecobee was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

    The ‘887 Patent Survives Alice Step One

    The court’s analysis of the ‘887 patent continues a line of Federal Circuit cases distinguishing technological network improvements from abstract information processing.

    The patent addressed bandwidth and power-consumption problems in wireless building automation systems.

    Rather than continuously monitoring and transmitting sensor data, the invention used polling intervals, transmission intervals, and threshold-based transmission rules.

    Information was transmitted only when certain conditions were met.

    ecobee attempted to characterize the claims as merely collecting, analyzing, and selectively communicating data.

    The Federal Circuit rejected that framing.

    Drawing support from cases such as Packet Intelligence v. NetScout, CardioNet v. InfoBionic, and Data Engine Technologies v. Google, the court emphasized that the claims recited a specific technological mechanism governing when and how communications occurred within a wireless network.

    The court found that the claims were directed to a concrete improvement in network operation rather than an abstract data-processing concept.

    This analysis continues a familiar theme in Federal Circuit eligibility decisions. Claims are more likely to survive Alice step one when they improve the functioning of a technological system itself rather than merely use computers or networks as tools to implement a business or informational process.

    The ‘371 Patent Also Survives Section 101

    The court reached a similar conclusion regarding the ‘371 patent.

    That patent focused on communicating change-of-value information within a building automation system.

    The claims involved two key concepts:

    • Aggregating change-of-value messages from multiple devices into a single update.
    • Repeatedly transmitting updates until acknowledgment was received.

    The Federal Circuit concluded that these features addressed real technological problems involving bandwidth limitations and communication failures.

    Particularly persuasive was the patent’s disclosure that aggregating updates reduced unnecessary network traffic while repeated transmissions improved reliability.

    The court compared the claims favorably to those upheld in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Electronics USA, Inc., where specific modifications to communication protocols produced functional improvements in network operation.

    Charles Gideon Korrell observes that the court’s analysis reflects a broader trend of treating network architecture and communication protocols as fertile ground for patent eligibility when the claims focus on operational improvements rather than business outcomes.

    Infringement of the ‘371 Patent Survives Review

    ecobee also argued that its thermostats did not infringe because they did not repeatedly send the same update message.

    The Federal Circuit rejected that argument.

    Ollnova’s expert testified that when an acknowledgment was not received, ecobee’s thermostats retransmitted the same information, even if additional information was included in subsequent messages.

    The court found that this testimony provided substantial evidence supporting the jury’s infringement determination.

    Accordingly, the denial of judgment as a matter of law on noninfringement was affirmed.

    What Makes This Opinion Important

    This case matters for several reasons.

    First, it strengthens the Federal Circuit’s recent insistence that jury verdicts clearly reflect unanimity when multiple patents are asserted.

    Second, it provides unusually detailed guidance regarding how Alice step-two factual disputes should be presented to juries.

    Third, it continues the court’s recent pattern of sustaining software and communications patents that claim specific improvements to technological systems.

    Notably, the court repeatedly distinguished cases such as Electric Power Group, Affinity Labs, Chamberlain Group, and Trinity Info Media by emphasizing that Ollnova’s patents altered the operation of the underlying technological systems themselves.

    That distinction remains central to modern Section 101 doctrine.

    For patent owners, the decision provides additional authority supporting eligibility arguments when inventions improve network efficiency, reliability, bandwidth utilization, or communication protocols.

    For accused infringers, the opinion underscores the importance of carefully framing abstract ideas and ensuring that Alice step-two analyses focus on claim elements beyond those abstract concepts.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes the most enduring aspect of the decision may be its procedural guidance. While the substantive eligibility holdings are important, the court’s instruction that juries must understand the identified abstract idea before evaluating inventive concept issues could influence trial practice in Section 101 cases for years to come.

    Looking Ahead

    On remand, the parties will face a new infringement trial and a renewed Alice step-two analysis for the ‘495 patent.

    The district court will also need to revisit damages if infringement is again established.

    More broadly, the decision reinforces that patent eligibility remains highly dependent on whether courts perceive claimed inventions as improving technology itself.

    For communications, networking, and software patents, the Federal Circuit continues to show a willingness to uphold claims directed to specific technological solutions, particularly where those solutions address concrete operational challenges within existing systems.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that practitioners should view Ollnova v. ecobee as both a Section 101 decision and a trial-practice decision. Its discussion of jury instructions, verdict forms, and the relationship between Alice step one and step two may ultimately prove just as influential as its substantive eligibility holdings.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Coda Development v. Goodyear Tire: When Trade Secrets Collapse Under the Weight of Overbreadth

    Coda Development v. Goodyear Tire: When Trade Secrets Collapse Under the Weight of Overbreadth

    On December 8, 2025, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Ohio’s judgment as a matter of law wiping out a $64 million jury verdict in Coda Development s.r.o. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 23-1880 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2025). The court concluded that no reasonable jury could have found Goodyear liable for trade secret misappropriation under Ohio law and likewise upheld the district court’s rejection of Coda’s correction-of-inventorship claim directed to Goodyear’s U.S. Patent No. 8,042,586.

    The decision is a careful, methodical application of trade secret doctrine, but it also fits into a broader pattern of Federal Circuit cases from the past two years in which jury verdicts in IP cases have been set aside on post-trial motions. At its core, Coda v. Goodyear reinforces a lesson that courts have been increasingly unwilling to soften: trade secrets must be defined with precision, anchored in secrecy, and proven to have been actually used. Aspirational descriptions and lists of desired functions will not survive judicial scrutiny.

    Background and Procedural Posture

    Coda Development and its related entities developed self-inflating tire (SIT) technology and engaged in discussions with Goodyear regarding potential collaboration. When Goodyear later introduced its own SIT system, Coda sued, asserting claims for trade secret misappropriation under the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act (OUTSA) and seeking correction of inventorship on the ’586 patent.

    After a September 2022 jury trial, Coda appeared to have achieved a resounding victory. The jury found misappropriation of five alleged trade secrets and awarded $2.8 million in compensatory damages and $61.2 million in punitive damages. The district court, however, granted Goodyear’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that each asserted trade secret failed on one or more required elements. The court also denied Coda’s correction-of-inventorship claim following a bench determination based on written submissions.

    On appeal, Coda challenged nearly every aspect of those rulings. The Federal Circuit affirmed across the board.

    The Governing Legal Framework

    Because the trade secret claims arose under Ohio law, the Federal Circuit applied Sixth Circuit precedent interpreting the OUTSA. To prevail, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a trade secret; (2) acquisition through a confidential relationship or improper means; and (3) unauthorized use. Critically, courts also require that the alleged trade secret be defined with sufficient definiteness to allow adjudication of secrecy and misappropriation.

    The panel emphasized that this definiteness requirement is not a technicality. Without a concrete definition, courts cannot distinguish protected information from general industry knowledge or public disclosures.

    TS 24 and the Problem of Public Disclosure

    Trade Secret 24 became the focal point of the appeal. Coda defined TS 24 as knowledge regarding the optimal placement of a pump in a tire, specifically “in the sidewall close to, and above, the rim where the tire cyclically deforms.”

    The Federal Circuit had little difficulty affirming the district court’s conclusion that this information was publicly disclosed years earlier. Coda’s own 2007 PCT application and a 2008 Tire Technology article described pump placement in the tire sidewall near the rim. Trial testimony from Coda’s principal inventor confirmed that this placement concept was public.

    Faced with this record, Coda attempted to narrow TS 24 on appeal by arguing that its trade secret concerned placement in a “conventional” or “standard” tire sidewall, not merely any sidewall. The court rejected this reframing outright. The operative trade secret definition was the one Coda provided in response to court-ordered interrogatories, which were expressly “closed.” Post-hoc attempts to add limiting language through testimony or argument could not salvage an otherwise public disclosure.

    The panel’s analysis here is instructive. Once a trade secret plaintiff commits to a definition, courts will hold it to that definition. Elasticity cuts against secrecy.

    TS 7, TS 11, and TS 20: Functional Descriptions Are Not Trade Secrets

    The court next addressed three trade secrets that suffered from a different, but related, flaw. TS 7, TS 11, and TS 20 were each framed as combinations of components or lists of functions associated with self-inflating tire systems.

    For example, TS 7 described a “multi-purpose interface” capable of performing ten separate functions, including connecting various components, routing air, and holding filters. What it did not describe was the underlying design or development knowledge that enabled those functions.

    The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that this kind of functional description does not satisfy the definiteness requirement. A trade secret must identify the protectable knowledge itself, not merely the result it achieves. Lists of capabilities or end goals are indistinguishable from general engineering aspirations unless tethered to specific, non-public implementation details.

    TS 11 and TS 20 fared no better. Each consisted of long lists of features, geometries, and system concepts, but none articulated how those elements were designed, selected, or combined in a way that would meaningfully separate secret knowledge from what was already known in the field.

    The court’s reasoning echoes a growing body of appellate authority rejecting “laundry list” trade secrets. Courts expect plaintiffs asserting complex technical trade secrets to do the hard work of separating the secret from the surrounding noise.

    Failure of Proof on “Use”

    Even if the asserted trade secrets had been valid, the Federal Circuit concluded that Coda failed to present sufficient evidence that Goodyear actually used them.

    Coda relied heavily on expert testimony asserting that Goodyear’s patents and internal documents reflected substantial portions of its trade secrets. But the court characterized this testimony as conclusory and unsupported. Identifying one or two overlapping concepts from a multi-element trade secret does not establish use of a “substantial portion,” particularly where those concepts were themselves publicly disclosed.

    This aspect of the decision underscores a practical litigation reality: use must be proven with specificity. Generalized comparisons and thematic similarities will not carry a verdict through post-trial review.

    TS 23 and the Limits of Inference

    Trade Secret 23 concerned test results purportedly demonstrating that Coda’s pump designs could generate pressure exceeding tire cavity pressure. The only evidence of alleged disclosure and use was a January 2009 email summarizing certain test results.

    The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the email did not disclose all of the testing data encompassed by TS 23. Coda’s argument that Goodyear’s subsequent project advancement permitted an inference of reliance on the trade secret was deemed insufficient. Temporal proximity, without a clear evidentiary bridge, could not support a finding of use.

    Correction of Inventorship: Trade Secrets Are Not a Substitute for Conception

    Coda’s correction-of-inventorship claim rose or fell with its trade secret case. Because the court affirmed the JMOL ruling, there was no factual predicate left to support inventorship correction.

    The panel also rejected the argument that the district court improperly disregarded jury findings. The jury had never been asked to compare the scope of TS 24 with the claims of the ’586 patent. The district court’s conclusion that the alleged trade secret did not establish conception of the claimed invention therefore did not conflict with any jury determination.

    The court reiterated a fundamental principle of patent law: conception requires possession of every feature of the claimed invention. Trade secret allegations, particularly those found indefinite or publicly disclosed, cannot fill that gap.

    Broader Implications

    Coda v. Goodyear is less about hostility to juries than about judicial insistence on doctrinal discipline. Trade secret law offers powerful remedies, but only for plaintiffs willing to define their secrets narrowly, protect them rigorously, and prove their misuse with precision.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes that the decision serves as a reminder that trade secret claims must be engineered with the same care as patent claims. Charles Gideon Korrell notes that overbroad definitions may play well before a jury but are vulnerable on post-trial review. Charles Gideon Korrell also observes that courts increasingly expect trade secret plaintiffs to articulate something closer to a “specification-level” disclosure when the technology is complex.

    For companies navigating collaborations, joint development discussions, or exploratory partnerships, the case reinforces the importance of disciplined information management. For litigators, it underscores the need to lock down trade secret definitions early and live with them through trial and appeal.

    In the end, Coda v. Goodyear stands as a cautionary tale: when everything is a trade secret, nothing is.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Optis Cellular Technology v. Apple Inc.: Federal Circuit Orders New Trial on Infringement and Damages Due to Unanimity Violation and Improper Evidence

    Optis Cellular Technology v. Apple Inc.: Federal Circuit Orders New Trial on Infringement and Damages Due to Unanimity Violation and Improper Evidence

    The Federal Circuit’s June 16, 2025, decision in Optis Cellular Technology, LLC v. Apple Inc., Nos. 2022-1904, 2022-1925, vacates a $300 million damages judgment in a high-stakes standard-essential patent (SEP) case and mandates a new trial on both infringement and damages. The court found that the Eastern District of Texas violated Apple’s constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict and improperly admitted prejudicial evidence, including a large Apple-Qualcomm settlement. The ruling also carries broader implications for the treatment of abstract claims under § 101 and functional claim limitations under § 112 ¶ 6.

    Key Takeaway

    The Federal Circuit vacated both the infringement and damages verdicts because the jury verdict form failed to ensure unanimity on specific claims, and because the district court improperly admitted a high-dollar Apple-Qualcomm settlement agreement. The court also held two of the asserted claims invalid under § 101, reversed a § 112 ¶ 6 ruling, and rejected the patentee’s request to reinstate a previously set-aside $506 million award.

    Background

    Optis, asserting a suite of five LTE standard-essential patents, sued Apple in the Eastern District of Texas in 2019. After an initial trial in 2020, the jury awarded Optis $506.2 million in damages, finding infringement and willfulness. However, the trial court granted Apple a new trial on damages due to improper exclusion of FRAND evidence. A second trial in 2021 resulted in a $300 million lump-sum verdict.

    Apple appealed, challenging liability, damages, claim construction, and admissibility of certain evidence. Optis cross-appealed, seeking reinstatement of the original damages verdict.

    The Verdict Form and Jury Unanimity Violation

    The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred by using a single verdict question that asked whether Apple infringed “ANY of the asserted claims” without distinguishing between the five asserted patents. This structure permitted a finding of liability even if jurors disagreed on which patents were infringed, violating Apple’s right to a unanimous verdict under the Seventh Amendment and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48(b):

    “The verdict form instructed the jury to find Apple liable for infringement regardless of whether all jurors agreed that Apple was infringing the same patent.” (Slip op. at 15)

    Despite the parties’ joint request for patent-by-patent questions, the district court rejected that format. The Federal Circuit deemed this a clear legal error warranting vacatur of the liability judgment and a new trial.

    Damages Verdict Also Vacated

    Because liability was vacated, the court also vacated the $300 million damages verdict. Notably, the district court had instructed the jury to assume all five patents were infringed for purposes of damages—an instruction that now lacks any valid liability finding to support it.

    Further, the court held that the district court abused its discretion under FRE 403 by admitting a high-value Apple-Qualcomm settlement agreement and allowing Optis’s expert to rely on it:

    “[T]he probative value of the Apple-Qualcomm settlement agreement and Mr. Kennedy’s testimony concerning the same is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” (Slip op. at 36)

    This agreement, which settled global disputes unrelated to the patents-in-suit, was deemed minimally probative and highly prejudicial.

    Patent Eligibility Under § 101

    The court reversed the district court’s denial of Apple’s § 101 motion on claims 6 and 7 of U.S. Patent No. 8,019,332, finding them directed to an abstract mathematical formula:

    “We conclude that the claims are directed to the abstract idea—a mathematical formula.” (Slip op. at 24)

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that the Federal Circuit found the claims failed Alice step one and remanded for further proceedings on step two.

    Means-Plus-Function and § 112 ¶ 6

    In another reversal, the Federal Circuit held that the term “selecting unit” in claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,411,557 invoked § 112 ¶ 6. It found “unit” to be a nonce term that fails to connote sufficient structure:

    “‘Selecting unit’ in the claim at issue here invokes § 112 ¶ 6.” (Slip op. at 31)

    The district court had relied on a prior Eastern District ruling, but the Federal Circuit found that opinion unpersuasive, particularly in light of Optis’s own assertion that the “unit” could be implemented in hardware or software. The matter was remanded to determine if the specification provides sufficient structure.

    Claim Construction Affirmed

    The court affirmed the construction of a key term in claim 8 of U.S. Patent No. 8,102,833, rejecting Apple’s argument that the mapping of ACK/NACK control signals required a specific start position.

    Optis’s Cross-Appeal Rejected

    Optis had sought reinstatement of the original $506.2 million award from the first trial, but the Federal Circuit dismissed the cross-appeal, concluding that:

    “[T]he first damages judgment presented the same verdict form issue… and thus cannot be reinstated.” (Slip op. at 36)

    Practical Implications

    This decision reinforces several critical points for SEP litigation and patent damages trials:

    1. Verdict Form Precision Matters: Patent plaintiffs must ensure verdict forms distinguish each asserted patent or claim to avoid violating the defendant’s right to unanimity.
    2. Evidence of Other Settlements Is Risky: Courts will scrutinize the use of large dollar-value settlements, especially when they involve different technologies or were driven by non-comparable litigation pressure.
    3. FRAND Damages Must Align with Liability: Damages awards must correspond to actual findings of infringement, particularly in FRAND cases.
    4. § 101 and § 112 Scrutiny Continues: The court’s reversals on patent eligibility and means-plus-function interpretation signal a continued willingness to invalidate improperly drafted claims—even in complex SEP disputes.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that the Federal Circuit’s opinion emphasizes procedural fairness as much as substantive patent doctrine. Charles Gideon Korrell also observes that the court’s insistence on clarity in verdict forms may drive future litigants to pay closer attention to the architecture of jury questions.

    Conclusion

    The Federal Circuit’s decision in Optis v. Apple is a comprehensive rebuke of multiple aspects of the trial court’s handling of a major SEP case. By ordering a new trial on both liability and damages and reversing several key legal rulings, the opinion sets important precedent for how SEP litigation should be conducted and how damages should be assessed.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell