Technology & Information Law Blog by Charles Gideon Korrell

Tag: CAFC

  • Ingevity v. BASF: Federal Circuit Affirms $84.8M Antitrust Verdict for Patent-Based Tying of Staple Goods

    Ingevity v. BASF: Federal Circuit Affirms $84.8M Antitrust Verdict for Patent-Based Tying of Staple Goods

    On February 11, 2026, the Federal Circuit in Ingevity Corp. v. BASF Corp., No. 2024-1577, affirmed a jury verdict finding unlawful tying under the Sherman Act and upholding a $28.3 million damages award (trebled to approximately $84.8 million).

    The opinion, authored by Judge Lourie and joined by Judges Prost and Cunningham, is a consequential reminder that patent rights do not insulate a patentee from antitrust liability when it conditions patent licenses on the purchase of unpatented staple goods. It also clarifies the interaction between 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)–(d), the “staple article” doctrine, and antitrust tying principles under the Sherman Act.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes that, for those advising on patent licensing strategies—particularly in industrial and automotive supply chains—this decision deserves careful study.

    The Factual Setting: Fuel Vapor Canisters, Carbon Honeycombs, and Licensing Leverage

    Ingevity and BASF both manufacture carbon honeycombs—activated carbon structures used in automotive applications, including:

    • Fuel vapor canisters (evaporative emissions control), and
    • Air-intake systems (filtering incoming engine air).

    Ingevity owned U.S. Patent RE38,844, directed to a dual-stage fuel vapor canister system. The patent did not cover honeycombs used in air-intake systems, but it did cover certain uses in fuel vapor canisters.

    BASF introduced a competing honeycomb product (EvapTrap XC). Ingevity sued for patent infringement. BASF counterclaimed, alleging:

    • Unlawful tying (Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2),
    • Exclusive dealing, and
    • Tortious interference.

    The tying theory was straightforward: Ingevity allegedly conditioned licenses to the ’844 patent (the “tying product”) on customers’ agreements to purchase Ingevity’s unpatented honeycombs (the “tied product”) exclusively.

    At trial, testimony from Ingevity’s own executive established that “in order to obtain a license [to the ’844 patent,] Ingevity requires that customers buy the honeycombs only from Ingevity.”

    As Charles Gideon Korrell notes, that testimony proved pivotal.

    The Patent Misuse Defense: The Staple vs. Nonstaple Divide

    Ingevity’s principal defense rested on 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), which protects patentees from being “deemed guilty of misuse” when controlling nonstaple goods—those not suitable for substantial noninfringing use.

    The statutory structure is familiar:

    • § 271(c): Contributory infringement applies only to components “not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”
    • § 271(d): A patentee shall not be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse for actions taken to enforce such rights.

    The Supreme Court in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980), made clear that patentees may lawfully control nonstaple goods that have no substantial noninfringing use.

    Ingevity argued that its honeycombs were nonstaple and thus lawfully subject to control—even if that control suppressed competition in an unpatented goods market.

    The jury rejected that premise.

    Substantial Evidence of Staple Goods

    The central factual question was whether Ingevity’s honeycombs had “actual and substantial noninfringing uses.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding that they did.

    1. Documentary Sales Evidence

    BASF introduced Ingevity’s own internal records showing repeated sales of honeycombs for air-intake systems (a concededly noninfringing use), totaling more than 18,000 units across multiple years.

    Ingevity claimed those records were typographical errors. The jury was free to disbelieve that explanation—particularly where no corroborating evidence supported it.

    2. Technical Evidence

    BASF relied on:

    • The Park patent (covering Ingevity’s honeycomb manufacturing process), which disclosed air-intake use as an intended application, and
    • Expert testimony establishing suitability for air-intake systems.

    Ingevity offered no competing expert testimony demonstrating technical impossibility.

    3. “Substantial” Does Not Mean Majority

    Ingevity argued that 18,000 units were not “substantial” relative to total sales. The Federal Circuit rejected a rigid proportionality test, citing Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

    “Substantial” does not require majority usage. It excludes only uses that are “unusual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical, occasional, aberrant, or experimental.”

    Recurring, commercially viable noninfringing uses met the standard.

    Once the product was deemed a staple, § 271(d) no longer shielded the tying conduct.

    Immunity: Noerr-Pennington and the Failed Reframing

    Ingevity also argued immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, claiming its conduct was merely patent enforcement.

    But the jury instructions explicitly distinguished:

    • Protected patent communications, from
    • Unlawful tying or exclusive dealing beyond the scope of the patent monopoly.

    By finding unlawful tying, the jury necessarily found conduct beyond mere enforcement.

    On appeal, Ingevity attempted to reframe its argument, asserting that even actual tying of staple goods was immune under Rohm & Haas. The Federal Circuit held this theory forfeited and unsupported.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that the court emphasized that no authority extends immunity to classic commercial tying conduct merely because a patent is involved.

    Antitrust Framework: Classic Tying

    Under Third Circuit law (applied here), tying requires:

    1. Two distinct products,
    2. Market power in the tying product, and
    3. A substantial effect on interstate commerce.

    The court cited Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), and Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), reinforcing that patent ownership does not automatically establish market power—but neither does it immunize leveraging that power into adjacent markets.

    Even a lawfully obtained patent monopoly cannot be expanded to control staple goods outside the patent’s scope.

    Damages: No Mandatory Disaggregation

    The jury awarded $28.3 million (trebled).

    Ingevity argued BASF failed to disaggregate damages attributable to unlawful tying from those caused by lawful patent enforcement.

    The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, citing:

    A plaintiff need only show that unlawful conduct was a “material or substantial cause” of injury.

    Where unlawful and lawful conduct are intertwined, the defendant “bears the risk of the uncertainty which [its] own wrong has created.”

    The jury was entitled to credit BASF’s expert testimony that disaggregation was infeasible.

    Strategic Takeaways

    Charles Gideon Korrell sees this case carrying several significant implications.

    1. Staple Goods Are a Dangerous Lever. If a component has substantial noninfringing uses, tying it to patent licenses is high-risk. The § 271(d) safe harbor evaporates.
    2. Internal Records Matter. Ingevity’s own spreadsheets and memos proved decisive. Internal “end use” designations can become antitrust evidence years later.
    3. Expert Silence Is Costly. Ingevity offered no technical expert to refute suitability for air-intake systems. The absence of rebuttal evidence allowed the jury to accept BASF’s narrative.
    4. Immunity Arguments Must Be Preserved. The Federal Circuit’s forfeiture holding underscores the importance of maintaining consistent legal theories from summary judgment through appeal.
    5. Damages Models Need Not Be Perfect. When unlawful tying affects price, access, and competitive positioning simultaneously, courts may permit aggregated damages models.

    The Mooted Patent Invalidity Issue

    The district court had earlier granted summary judgment invalidating the ’844 patent under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). The Federal Circuit did not reach that issue.

    Because the jury’s tying verdict rendered the patent unenforceable—and the patent expired during appeal—the invalidity question was moot.

    Broader Implications for Licensing Strategy

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes that for companies operating in vertically integrated supply chains—automotive, industrial filtration, semiconductors, biotech reagents—the message is clear:

    • Conditioning licenses on exclusive purchases of staple components can trigger Sherman Act liability.
    • Patent enforcement communications are protected; commercial tying conduct is not.
    • Section 271(d) is a shield only when the tied product is truly nonstaple.

    This opinion reinforces the long-standing principle that patent rights define the boundary of lawful exclusion—and that stepping beyond that boundary can transform intellectual property leverage into antitrust exposure.

    The Federal Circuit’s analysis carefully harmonizes patent misuse doctrine, contributory infringement law, and antitrust tying jurisprudence without expanding immunity doctrines beyond established precedent.

    For practitioners structuring licensing programs, careful product classification analysis and clean separation of patent rights from commercial supply obligations are essential.

    The Federal Circuit’s decision in Ingevity Corp. v. BASF Corp. stands as a powerful reminder that the line between aggressive patent licensing and unlawful tying is policed not just by misuse doctrine—but by federal antitrust law itself.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • GoTV v. Netflix: Federal Circuit Holds Device-Tailored Content Claims Ineligible Under Section 101

    GoTV v. Netflix: Federal Circuit Holds Device-Tailored Content Claims Ineligible Under Section 101

    On February 9, 2026, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in GoTV Streaming, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., reversing a jury verdict and holding that three related GoTV patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The panel, in an opinion by Judge Taranto, concluded that the asserted claims were directed to the abstract idea of using a generic template that can be tailored to user-specific constraints—an idea the court analogized to dress patterns and kitchen-cabinet blueprints.

    This decision offers a detailed and methodical application of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, reinforcing several recurring themes in the court’s post-Alice jurisprudence: (1) result-focused functional language will not carry a claim past step one; (2) invoking servers and wireless devices performing ordinary functions does not convert an abstract idea into a technological improvement; and (3) conclusory expert testimony cannot salvage eligibility at step two.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that the opinion is particularly instructive because it walks carefully through claim construction before applying Alice, demonstrating how intrinsic evidence frames the eligibility inquiry.

    The Patents and the Claimed “Advance”

    GoTV asserted three related patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 8,478,245; 8,989,715; and 8,103,865) sharing a 2007 specification. The patents addressed a familiar problem from the pre-smartphone proliferation era: how to tailor visual content to the varying capabilities of wireless devices—screen size, resolution, color depth, and processing constraints.

    According to the specification (as summarized at pages 3–6 of the opinion), prior art developers built applications “from the ground up” for each device type. The purported solution was to centralize tailoring at a server. The server would:

    • Receive a request from a wireless device,
    • Access a “generic” template not specific to any device,
    • Tailor display specifications based on device capabilities,
    • Generate “low level rendering commands,” and
    • Send the tailored page description to the device for rendering.

    Claim 1 of the ’865 patent was treated as representative. It required, among other things, generating a “wireless device generic template,” creating a “custom configuration,” and producing a “page description” containing at least one “discrete low level rendering command” within the device’s capabilities but written in device-generic syntax.

    Claim Construction First: Reversing Indefiniteness

    Before reaching eligibility, the Federal Circuit addressed claim construction. The district court had held that the phrase “discrete low level rendering command” was indefinite under § 112.

    The Federal Circuit reversed. Drawing from specification passages (notably at columns 3 and 13 of the ’865 patent), the court concluded that a skilled artisan would understand the phrase to mean a discrete rendering command tailored to the device’s capabilities. The opinion emphasized that redundancy concerns in the district court’s reasoning did not rise to the level of “reasonable uncertainty” under Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.

    Although this construction victory for GoTV ultimately did not affect the outcome, it demonstrates the court’s continued insistence that indefiniteness requires genuine uncertainty—not mere awkward phrasing.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes this portion of the opinion is a reminder that even when § 101 looms large, traditional claim construction doctrine remains central.

    Alice Step One: Directed to an Abstract Idea

    The core of the opinion lies in its step-one analysis.

    Relying on its established framework from cases such as Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., and Broadband iTV, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the court asked whether the claims were focused on a specific improvement in computer functionality or merely used computers as tools to implement an abstract idea.

    The court characterized the representative claim as directed to:

    “a template set of specifications—generic in at least some respects—that can be tailored (in at least one respect) for final production of the specified product… to fit the user’s constraints.”

    The opinion’s analogies were striking. The court compared the claims to:

    • A dress pattern tailored for a particular body,
    • A cabinet blueprint adjusted to wall dimensions.

    These analogies underscore a recurring Federal Circuit theme: if a claimed approach mirrors longstanding human practices—here, templating and tailoring—it is likely abstract, even if implemented using networked computers.

    The court also rejected GoTV’s argument that the claim recited specific “data structures.” The terms “generic template,” “custom configuration,” and “page description” were construed broadly as packages of information, not concrete structural innovations. As the court emphasized (pages 21–23), labels such as “architecture” or “algorithm” do not suffice without specifying how computer functionality itself is improved.

    The panel distinguished Visual Memory LLC v. Nvidia Corp. (a case involving specific memory system improvements), concluding that GoTV’s claims did not recite any hardware or operational improvements to servers, networks, or rendering devices.

    Alice Step Two: No Inventive Concept

    Having found the claims abstract, the court moved to step two.

    Here, the court reiterated familiar principles from cases such as BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc. and Berkheimer v. HP Inc.: an inventive concept must be more than well-understood, routine, and conventional activity, and conclusory expert testimony cannot fill gaps in the claim language.

    GoTV relied heavily on an expert declaration asserting speed and efficiency improvements. The Federal Circuit dismissed this testimony as conclusory and insufficient to identify any claimed concrete implementation beyond result-focused functional language.

    Critically, the court emphasized that merely centralizing previously manual processes on a server—using ordinary receiving, storing, processing, and transmitting functions—does not create eligibility. Efficiency gains attributable to generic computer use are not enough.

    The claims therefore failed step two and were held invalid under § 101.

    Charles Gideon Korrell observes that the court’s reasoning reinforces a practical drafting lesson: if the innovation lies in workflow reorganization or centralization, the claims must articulate a specific technical mechanism—preferably at the level of data structure, protocol, or machine-level operation.

    Procedural Notes: Inducement and Damages

    Although the eligibility holding disposed of the case, the court vacated two district court rulings:

    1. Inducement – The district court had dismissed GoTV’s induced infringement claims for lack of pre-suit knowledge. The Federal Circuit did not decide the issue but noted that GoTV’s arguments were substantial, citing In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing System Patent Litigation and State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp.
    2. Damages Evidence – The court also vacated the denial of a new trial motion concerning damages evidence, referencing concerns about whether Netflix’s presentations skewed the hypothetical negotiation framework under VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corp.

    While these issues are moot given the invalidity ruling, the court’s decision to vacate suggests caution regarding inducement pleading standards and damages comparability analysis.

    Broader Implications

    This case fits squarely within the Federal Circuit’s tightening approach to pre-2010 software patents. The opinion reinforces several trends:

    • Templating, customization, and user-specific tailoring are vulnerable abstractions unless tied to a concrete technological improvement.
    • Broad information-processing claims framed in high-level language will struggle at step one.
    • Expert testimony cannot substitute for claim-level specificity.

    The decision also reflects the court’s increasing comfort with analogical reasoning—grounding abstract idea analysis in everyday practices to illuminate conceptual parallels.

    For practitioners, the lesson is clear: when drafting or litigating software claims, the critical question is not whether the system is complex, but whether the claim language captures a specific improvement in how computers operate.

    Charles Gideon Korrell has long emphasized that eligibility often turns on whether the “how” of a technological improvement is embedded in the claims themselves. GoTV v. Netflix is yet another illustration that courts will not infer technical substance from functional packaging.

    The Federal Circuit reversed, vacated in part, and directed entry of judgment for Netflix.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Range of Motion Prods v. Armaid: Narrow Design Patent Scope and the Growing Role of “Plainly Dissimilar”

    Range of Motion Prods v. Armaid: Narrow Design Patent Scope and the Growing Role of “Plainly Dissimilar”

    On February 2, 2026, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement in Range of Motion Products, LLC v. Armaid Company Inc., No. 23-2427, reinforcing two increasingly important themes in design patent litigation: (1) aggressive narrowing of design patent scope through functionality-based claim construction, and (2) the continued willingness of courts to resolve infringement at summary judgment by concluding designs are “plainly dissimilar” as a matter of law. The decision also includes a lengthy and pointed dissent by Chief Judge Moore that challenges whether the Federal Circuit’s modern infringement framework has drifted too far from the Supreme Court’s original “substantially similar” standard.

    Background and the Design at Issue

    Range of Motion Products (“RoM”) owns U.S. Design Patent No. D802,155, titled “Body Massaging Apparatus.” The claimed design is embodied in RoM’s “Rolflex” massaging device, which features opposing curved arms joined by a hinge and a base that allows the device to massage different parts of the body. Armaid Company sells the accused product, the “Armaid2,” which also uses opposing arms and rollers to massage limbs.

    Armaid had previously sold an earlier device, the “Armaid1,” which was covered by a utility patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,792,081. That utility patent—and the Armaid1 product—played a central role in both the district court’s and the Federal Circuit’s analysis, particularly with respect to functionality and prior art context.

    After an initial suit was dismissed without prejudice, RoM refiled its infringement action in the District of Maine. The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement, concluding that many aspects of the D’155 design were functional, that the scope of the claimed design was therefore narrow, and that no reasonable jury could find the accused Armaid2 design substantially similar to the claimed design once functional elements were factored out.

    Claim Construction and Functional Versus Ornamental Features

    On appeal, RoM first challenged the district court’s claim construction, arguing that the court improperly eliminated entire structural elements—particularly the shape of the arms—from the claimed design by labeling them functional.

    The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. Relying heavily on Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., PHG Technologies, LLC v. St. John Companies, and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., the court reiterated that design patents may contain elements that are partly functional and partly ornamental. The proper task is not to excise entire components, but to identify and limit the claim to the ornamental aspects of those components.

    Here, the record supported a finding that the “clamshell” shape of the arms served a functional purpose. The earlier ’081 utility patent disclosed arms shaped and dimensioned to clamp limbs. Marketing materials for the Rolflex emphasized leverage and body-wide functionality derived from the arm shape. Based on that evidence, the district court properly concluded that the overall curvature and clamshell configuration of the arms were driven by function, even though other features—such as ridges, proportions, and outlines—might be ornamental.

    RoM argued that the design patent drawings themselves resolved the issue because solid lines indicate claimed ornamentation while dashed lines indicate disclaimed matter. The Federal Circuit firmly rejected that approach. Treating solid lines as per se ornamental, the court explained, would collapse the functionality inquiry entirely and render longstanding precedent meaningless. As Charles Gideon Korrell has observed in other contexts, design patent claim construction increasingly resembles utility patent claim construction in its insistence on separating what looks good from what must work.

    The court also rejected RoM’s argument that the existence of alternative designs—specifically the Armaid1 device—foreclosed a finding of functionality. Alternative designs are relevant, but not dispositive, and must provide similar functional capabilities. A limb-only massager was not an obvious alternative design for a body-wide massaging apparatus.

    Infringement and the “Plainly Dissimilar” Framework

    Turning to infringement, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment under the ordinary observer test articulated in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. Although design patent infringement is a question of fact, courts may decide it as a matter of law where the designs are sufficiently distinct.

    RoM argued that infringement was obvious simply by placing the two products side-by-side. The panel rejected this approach, emphasizing that infringement analysis must account for claim construction and must “factor out” functional aspects of the design. Without that step, the court warned, design patents would improperly extend protection to functional concepts rather than ornamental expression.

    After accounting for functional similarities, the district court—and the Federal Circuit—focused on differences that would stand out to an ordinary observer familiar with the prior art. These included:

    • The prominence and proportions of the base and hinge structure.
    • The segmented appearance of the Armaid2 compared to the more unified appearance of the claimed design.
    • Differences in slot sizing and visual emphasis.
    • Differences in curvature and overall “stylized impression.”

    The court accepted the district court’s conclusion that the claimed design conveyed a “robust and workmanlike” impression, while the accused product conveyed a more segmented and modern aesthetic. Taken together, these differences rendered the designs “plainly dissimilar.”

    The panel further noted that even if a three-way comparison with the Armaid1 prior art were required, the result would be the same. Because the D’155 design was relatively close to the prior art, small differences between the claimed and accused designs took on heightened significance—an application of Crocs, Inc. v. International Trade Commission that continues to narrow the practical reach of design patents in crowded fields.

    Chief Judge Moore’s Dissent: A Call to Revisit Egyptian Goddess

    Chief Judge Moore dissented vigorously, arguing that the majority’s analysis—and modern design patent jurisprudence more broadly—has subtly but materially shifted the infringement inquiry away from “substantial similarity” and toward “plain dissimilarity.”

    In her view, this linguistic shift matters. Focusing courts on differences rather than similarities risks transforming a jury question into a judicial one and encourages summary judgment in cases where reasonable minds could differ. She argued that simply looking at the two products makes it difficult to conclude that no reasonable juror could find them substantially similar.

    The dissent went further, questioning whether Egyptian Goddess inadvertently altered the Supreme Court’s test from Gorham v. White. Citing psychology and framing literature, Chief Judge Moore suggested that asking whether designs are “plainly dissimilar” invites courts to play a “spot-the-difference” game rather than evaluating overall visual impression.

    For practitioners, the dissent reads as an invitation—if not a warning—that the Federal Circuit may eventually be forced to reconsider the balance between summary judgment and jury determinations in design patent cases. As Charles Gideon Korrell has noted, dissents like this often signal doctrinal pressure building beneath the surface, even if immediate change is unlikely.

    Key Takeaways

    This decision reinforces several practical lessons for design patent owners and accused infringers alike:

    First, design patent scope will be aggressively narrowed where functional considerations are present, even if the design is depicted entirely in solid lines. Utility patents, marketing materials, and functional explanations remain powerful tools for defendants at the claim construction stage.

    Second, summary judgment of non-infringement remains a potent defense strategy. Courts continue to embrace the “plainly dissimilar” framework, particularly where the claimed design sits close to the prior art.

    Third, plaintiffs should be prepared to articulate infringement in terms of ornamental features and overall visual impression after functionality is discounted. Side-by-side similarity alone is unlikely to survive summary judgment.

    Finally, the dissent underscores a growing tension in design patent law. Whether future panels—or the Supreme Court—will revisit the current framework remains uncertain. For now, however, Range of Motion v. Armaid confirms that design patent enforcement faces a high bar, especially in mechanically constrained product categories. Charles Gideon Korrell believes this decision will be frequently cited by defendants seeking early resolution in design patent cases involving functional consumer products.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Sound View Innovations v. Hulu: When Grammar and Logic Dictate the Order of Method Steps

    Sound View Innovations v. Hulu: When Grammar and Logic Dictate the Order of Method Steps

    On January 29, 2026, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, affirming summary judgment of noninfringement based on the required sequence of steps in a method claim. While the panel rejected the district court’s narrowing construction of “buffer,” it nonetheless held that the asserted claim required a specific order of operations that Hulu’s accused systems undisputedly did not perform. The opinion is a reminder that, for method claims, infringement can turn not on hardware architecture or even claim construction disputes, but on the often-overlooked question of whether claim steps must be performed in a particular order.

    Background of the ’213 Patent and the Dispute

    The asserted patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,708,213, relates to methods for reducing latency in streaming multimedia over public networks. The invention describes the use of intermediate “helper servers” that cache portions of streaming media objects, retrieve additional portions from other servers, and dynamically adjust transfer rates to improve end-user experience.

    Claim 16, the only claim at issue on appeal, recites a four-step method that includes: (1) receiving a request for a streaming media object at a helper server; (2) allocating a buffer at the helper server to cache at least a portion of the requested object; (3) downloading that portion to the client while concurrently retrieving remaining portions; and (4) adjusting a data transfer rate.

    Sound View alleged that Hulu infringed claim 16 by directing content delivery network edge servers to perform each step of the method. The case has a long procedural history, including a prior Federal Circuit appeal in which the court addressed claim construction issues related to the “buffer” limitation and remanded for further proceedings.

    On remand, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement on two independent grounds. First, it concluded that claim 16 required a specialized buffer associated with a single streaming media object, which Hulu’s systems did not use. Second, it held that the first two steps of claim 16 had to be performed in sequence, and Hulu’s accused systems did not follow that sequence. Sound View appealed both rulings.

    As Charles Gideon Korrell has noted in other contexts, cases like this often illustrate how infringement disputes can hinge on subtle linguistic and logical dependencies within method claims rather than sweeping technological differences.

    The Federal Circuit Rejects a “Specialized Buffer” Requirement

    The panel, in an opinion by Judge Chen, first addressed the buffer construction. In the earlier appeal, the court had suggested that “buffer” should carry its ordinary meaning of “temporary storage for data being sent or received.” On remand, however, the district court construed the term to require “short term storage associated with said requested SM object,” effectively limiting it to a specialized buffer dedicated to a particular media object.

    The Federal Circuit disagreed. Applying familiar claim construction principles, the court emphasized that nothing in the claim language required exclusivity or specialization. Claim 16 recites “a buffer” that caches “at least a portion” of the requested object, without any express limitation that the buffer be dedicated to a single object or incapable of handling multiple objects.

    The specification did not compel a narrower reading either. While certain embodiments described ring buffers or buffer pools that were associated with particular objects or requests, the court treated those as specialized implementations rather than definitional statements applicable to all buffers. Nor did the prosecution history rise to the level of a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of general-purpose buffers.

    Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in narrowing the term “buffer” beyond its ordinary meaning. Standing alone, this holding would have favored Sound View. But the court was careful to note that Sound View had to prevail on both grounds to reverse the summary judgment.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes this portion of the opinion reinforces a recurring theme in Federal Circuit jurisprudence: absent clear definitional language or unmistakable disclaimer, courts are reluctant to import structural limitations from preferred embodiments into broadly drafted claim terms.

    Implicit Ordering in Method Claims Takes Center Stage

    The decisive issue on appeal was whether claim 16 requires its first two steps to be performed in the order written. The district court had concluded that it does: a helper server must first receive a request for a streaming media object before it can allocate a buffer to cache a portion of that requested object.

    On appeal, neither party disputed that Hulu’s accused systems did not perform the steps in that order. The only question was whether the claim required such an order at all.

    The Federal Circuit began with the general rule articulated in cases like Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.: unless a method claim explicitly recites an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one. But that rule has a well-established exception. As explained in Mformation Technologies, Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., a claim requires an order when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, demands it, or when the specification directly or implicitly requires it.

    Here, the court found both grammar and logic dispositive. The first step recites “receiving a request for an SM object.” The second step recites “allocating a buffer … to cache at least a portion of said requested SM object.” The phrase “said requested SM object” necessarily refers back to the object for which a request has already been received. Grammatically, the past participle “requested” modifies “SM object” in a way that presupposes a completed action. Logically, an object cannot be “requested” until a request has occurred.

    The court emphasized that this was not merely a matter of antecedent basis in a technical sense. The word “requested” functioned as a status indicator. Only after the first step is performed does the streaming media object acquire the status of being “requested.” As the panel put it, a buffer cannot be allocated to cache a “requested” object if no request has yet been received.

    This reasoning aligned with prior cases such as E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp. and Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., where the Federal Circuit found implicit ordering based on logical dependencies between steps. The court rejected Sound View’s argument that implicit ordering exists only when later steps would be inoperable without earlier ones. Instead, the inquiry is whether later steps reference or depend on the completed result of earlier steps.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this analysis underscores how carefully courts parse grammatical structure in method claims, sometimes assigning dispositive weight to a single adjective or verb tense.

    Rejected Arguments Based on Other Claims and Embodiments

    Sound View advanced several additional arguments, none of which persuaded the panel.

    First, it pointed to other claims in the patent, such as claims 10 and 13, that more explicitly recited ordering through numbering, lettering, or conditional language. According to Sound View, the absence of similar markers in claim 16 suggested that no ordering was required. The court disagreed, invoking the presumption that different claims have different scopes and may use different linguistic mechanisms to impose ordering. Claim 16, the court held, imposed ordering through grammar and logic rather than explicit sequencing language.

    Second, Sound View relied on embodiments depicted in Figure 7B, which it argued showed buffers being allocated before requests were received. The court found this unavailing. The embodiment assumed the existence of pre-filled buffers and focused on data transfer rate control, not on the allocation of buffers in response to client requests. Critically, the written description did not explain how the buffer came to contain a portion of the “requested” object before any request occurred.

    Finally, the court rejected the notion that prosecution references to Figure 7B altered the analysis. Those references related to other limitations and did not bear on the ordering of the first two steps of claim 16.

    Practical Takeaways for Drafting and Litigation

    The Federal Circuit’s decision in Sound View v. Hulu offers several practical lessons.

    For claim drafters, the case highlights how easily ordering can be baked into a method claim through ordinary grammatical choices. Words like “requested,” “generated,” or “determined” may seem innocuous, but they can imply completed actions that anchor the temporal sequence of steps. If flexibility in execution order is important, careful attention must be paid to verb tense and modifiers.

    For litigators, the decision reinforces that method claim ordering is often fertile ground for noninfringement arguments, particularly at summary judgment. Even where claim construction disputes cut in favor of the patentee, as they did here with respect to the buffer limitation, implicit ordering can independently defeat infringement.

    Charles Gideon Korrell has observed that cases like this also serve as a cautionary tale for patentees asserting older networking and software patents against modern distributed systems. Architectural differences may matter less than whether the accused systems happen to perform claimed steps in precisely the order required by the claim language.

    Conclusion

    In the end, Sound View Innovations v. Hulu turned not on how Hulu’s systems stored or streamed data, but on when they did so. By holding that claim 16 implicitly required receipt of a request before allocation of a buffer, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement despite rejecting one of the district court’s claim constructions. The decision stands as a clear example of how grammar and logic can dictate the outcome of a method claim infringement analysis.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC: Functional Claiming Meets Alice—Again

    US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC: Functional Claiming Meets Alice—Again

    On January 22, 2026, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a patent infringement complaint against Google at the pleading stage, holding that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,679,637 are patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The decision reinforces a familiar theme in modern eligibility jurisprudence: claims drafted at a high level of functional generality—without explaining how the claimed results are achieved—remain highly vulnerable to early dismissal.

    Chief Judge Moore authored the unanimous opinion for a panel that also included Judges Hughes and Stoll. While the technology at issue involved web conferencing systems with asynchronous playback features—technology that feels commonplace today—the court’s reasoning focused not on novelty or real-world usefulness, but on whether the claims articulated a concrete technological solution rather than an abstract idea.

    The Asserted Patent and the Accused Technology

    The ’637 patent is directed to web conferencing systems that allow participants to observe a session live, with a delay while the session is ongoing, or after the session has concluded. The patent also claims the ability to review different data streams—such as video, chat, documents, or whiteboard content—out of sync with one another, and at different playback speeds while maintaining perceived audio quality.

    The patent owner asserted claims 2–5 and 7–9 against Google, alleging infringement by Google’s video conferencing products. Google moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, denying leave to amend as futile. The Federal Circuit affirmed on appeal.

    Alice Step One: Asynchronous Review as an Abstract Idea

    At Alice Step One, the court asked whether the claims are “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept. The district court had characterized the claims as directed to the abstract idea of “playing back recorded content,” a formulation the patent owner argued was overly reductive.

    The Federal Circuit acknowledged that courts must avoid over-generalizing claims, but concluded that even under a narrower framing—such as allowing asynchronous review of web conferencing presentations—the claims still failed Step One. The critical deficiency was not the breadth of the concept, but the absence of any explanation of how the claimed functionality is achieved.

    Relying on cases such as Hawk Technology Systems, LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC and IBM v. Zillow Group, Inc., the court reiterated that software claims must focus on a specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities. Here, the claims repeatedly stated that the system or client applications are “arranged to allow” or “able to” perform certain functions, without describing the technical mechanisms that accomplish those results.

    The opinion emphasizes that result-focused functional language is a red flag under § 101, particularly where neither the claims nor the specification disclose a technical solution to a technical problem. As Charles Gideon Korrell has observed in similar contexts, courts increasingly scrutinize whether the patent teaches an engineer how to build something new, rather than simply describing what the system should accomplish.

    The written description did not save the claims. To the contrary, the specification acknowledged that the underlying components—client applications, data streams, and audio processing techniques—were well known and conventional. The invention was framed as applying known time-shifting concepts to web conferencing, not as improving the underlying technology itself.

    Distinguishing Contour IP v. GoPro

    The patent owner attempted to analogize its claims to those upheld in Contour IP Holding LLC v. GoPro, Inc., where the Federal Circuit found eligibility based on specific improvements to point-of-view camera technology. The court rejected the comparison.

    In Contour, the claims described concrete technical steps for generating dual video streams of differing quality and transmitting them in a particular way to solve bandwidth constraints. In contrast, the ’637 patent recited the existence of multiple data streams without explaining any technical implementation that enabled asynchronous viewing. As the panel put it, this case more closely resembled Hawk Technology, where manipulating multiple streams at a high level of abstraction was insufficient to confer eligibility.

    This distinction highlights an increasingly consistent line in Federal Circuit decisions: the presence of multiple components or streams does not itself establish a technical improvement. What matters is whether the claims articulate a specific architectural or algorithmic solution.

    Alice Step Two: No Inventive Concept in Conventional Components

    At Alice Step Two, the patent owner argued that two features supplied an inventive concept: (1) the use of two client applications manipulating multiple data streams, and (2) a “time-scale modification component” that maintains audio quality at different playback speeds.

    The court rejected both arguments. With respect to the dual-client architecture, the panel noted that merely reciting conventional software components performing their ordinary functions cannot transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. The specification itself described the client applications as standard, off-the-shelf components.

    The time-scale modification component fared no better. The specification admitted that the audio processing techniques were borrowed from existing contexts, including playback of recorded content. Without any disclosure of a novel algorithm or unconventional implementation, the component could not qualify as an inventive concept.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this portion of the opinion underscores a recurring problem for older software patents: candid admissions of conventionality in the specification, while often necessary for enablement, can later foreclose eligibility arguments under Step Two.

    Functional Claiming and the “Tu Quoque” Argument

    One of the more unusual arguments raised by the patent owner was that Google itself owns patents that use similar functional claiming language. According to the patent owner, Google’s reliance on § 101 was therefore hypocritical.

    The Federal Circuit disposed of this argument in short order. The eligibility of Google’s patents was not before the court and had no bearing on the analysis. Each patent must stand or fall on its own claims. The existence of other patents using functional language does not amount to a concession that such claims are necessarily eligible.

    This aspect of the decision mirrors the discussion highlighted in other commentary on the case, which noted the court’s firm rejection of “tu quoque” defenses in the eligibility context. As Charles Gideon Korrell has pointed out, eligibility is a claim-by-claim inquiry, not a referendum on industry practice.

    Procedural Posture: Dismissal at the Pleading Stage

    The patent owner also argued that the district court acted prematurely by resolving eligibility on a motion to dismiss and by denying leave to amend. The Federal Circuit disagreed.

    Citing Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Products, Inc. and Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd., the court reiterated that dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is appropriate where there are no factual allegations that could alter the eligibility analysis as a matter of law. Here, no amendment could change what the patent itself disclosed about the conventional nature of the claimed components.

    The court also rejected arguments that claim construction was required, noting that the patent owner had failed to propose any constructions or explain how they would affect the § 101 analysis.

    Takeaways

    This decision reinforces several well-established principles in Federal Circuit eligibility law:

    1. Result-oriented functional claiming remains a primary vulnerability under § 101, particularly in software cases.
    2. Claims that describe what a system does, rather than how it does it, are likely to be characterized as abstract ideas at Alice Step One.
    3. Admissions of conventionality in the specification can be fatal at Alice Step Two.
    4. Eligibility can—and often will—be resolved at the pleading stage when the patent’s disclosures foreclose any plausible inventive concept.

    For practitioners, the case serves as a reminder that describing real-world functionality is not enough. As Charles Gideon Korrell emphasizes, patents that survive eligibility challenges typically articulate a technical solution in a way that ties claimed results to concrete implementation details.

    The Federal Circuit’s opinion in US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC fits squarely within its recent § 101 jurisprudence and signals continued skepticism toward broad, functional software claims untethered to specific technological improvements.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Barry v. DePuy Synthes: The Federal Circuit Draws a Line Between Daubert Gatekeeping and Jury Factfinding

    Barry v. DePuy Synthes: The Federal Circuit Draws a Line Between Daubert Gatekeeping and Jury Factfinding

    On January 20, 2026, the Federal Circuit issued a significant decision clarifying the boundary between judicial gatekeeping under Daubert and the jury’s role as factfinder in patent infringement trials. In Barry v. DePuy Synthes Companies, the court reversed the exclusion of two key experts and vacated a judgment as a matter of law entered after the district court struck that testimony mid-trial. The opinion offers an important reminder that not every tension or inconsistency exposed on cross-examination rises to the level of an admissibility defect—and that Rule 702’s reliability inquiry must not be conflated with the merits of an expert’s conclusions.

    Background and Procedural Posture

    Dr. Mark Barry sued DePuy Synthes entities in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that DePuy induced surgeons to infringe claims of three patents covering spinal derotation techniques used to treat deformities such as scoliosis. The asserted patents describe tools and methods for “en bloc derotation,” allowing surgeons to manipulate multiple vertebrae simultaneously using linked derotation tools.

    Two categories of claims were at issue. The first required tools with a “handle means,” construed by the district court as “a part that is designed especially to be grasped by the hand.” The second, from a later patent, did not require a handle means but instead required cross-linking elements that caused tools to move in unison.

    Barry relied on two experts. His technical expert, Dr. Walid Yassir, opined that DePuy’s accused tools could be assembled and used in infringing configurations that met every claim limitation. His survey expert, Dr. David Neal, designed and administered a surgeon survey to estimate how often the accused tools were used in those infringing configurations, evidence that fed directly into Barry’s damages theory.

    Before trial, the district court denied DePuy’s Daubert motions directed at both experts, concluding that DePuy’s criticisms went to weight rather than admissibility. During trial, however—after both experts testified—the court reversed course. It excluded Dr. Yassir’s testimony on the ground that he contradicted the court’s claim construction of “handle means,” excluded Dr. Neal’s survey as methodologically unreliable, and then granted judgment as a matter of law for DePuy based on the absence of remaining expert evidence.

    Barry appealed.

    The Federal Circuit’s Majority Opinion

    Writing for the majority, Judge Stark reversed across the board. Applying Third Circuit law to the evidentiary rulings, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding both experts and erred in granting JMOL.

    1. Expert Testimony and Claim Construction

    The majority began from a well-established premise: expert testimony that contradicts a court’s claim construction is not helpful to the jury and must be excluded under Rule 702. The court cited Exergen, Liquid Dynamics, and more recent Federal Circuit precedent reiterating that experts may not present infringement opinions “untethered” from the court’s constructions.

    But the key question, according to the majority, was whether Dr. Yassir actually contradicted the construction—or instead merely applied it in a way DePuy disputed.

    The court emphasized that on direct examination, Dr. Yassir repeatedly recited the court’s construction verbatim and testified that he applied it in his analysis. His opinion was that various parts of the accused tools—including when linked together—were “designed especially to be grasped by the hand.”

    On cross-examination, DePuy elicited testimony that it later characterized as contradictory: statements suggesting that “everything” in a linked system could be a handle means, or that parts grasped during assembly could qualify. The district court viewed these statements as redefining “handle means” to include anything that must be grasped, rather than something designed especially to be grasped.

    The Federal Circuit disagreed. In the majority’s view, these exchanges revealed at most a dispute over how broadly the construction should be applied, not a rejection of the construction itself. The majority stressed that the district court’s own Markman order acknowledged that “handle means” could encompass a linked handle array, and that nothing in the construction precluded multiple components from qualifying when linked together.

    Crucially, the court distinguished between contradiction and lack of persuasiveness. An expert who applies the court’s construction in an expansive or aggressive way may be wrong, but that does not render the testimony inadmissible. As the majority put it, disputes over application, credibility, and probative weight are for the jury—not grounds for exclusion.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this portion of the opinion is best read as a warning against converting Daubert into a vehicle for resolving close infringement questions under the guise of reliability.

    2. Survey Evidence and Rule 702

    The court reached a similar conclusion regarding Dr. Neal’s survey. The district court excluded the survey based on concerns about representativeness, non-probability sampling, nonresponse bias, and alleged flaws in question design.

    The majority acknowledged that surveys must examine the proper universe and use a representative sample, but emphasized that methodological imperfections ordinarily go to weight, not admissibility. The court faulted the district court for failing to identify record evidence demonstrating that the alleged flaws rendered the survey unreliable under Rule 702, as opposed to merely vulnerable to cross-examination.

    Importantly, the majority observed that the district court relied largely on its own assessment of general survey principles rather than testimony from DePuy’s own survey expert tying those principles to fatal defects in Neal’s work. The court cited Third Circuit authority cautioning against excluding expert evidence simply because the judge believes the expert’s conclusions are incorrect.

    Here again, Charles Gideon Korrell believes the decision reflects a broader trend at the Federal Circuit: reaffirming that Daubert is a threshold inquiry into reliability, not a substitute for the adversarial process.

    3. Judgment as a Matter of Law

    Because the district court’s JMOL rested entirely on the absence of expert testimony after the exclusions, the Federal Circuit reversed that ruling as well. With both experts reinstated, the case was remanded for a new trial.

    The Dissent and the Rule 702 Amendments

    Judge Prost dissented, grounding her analysis firmly in the 2023 amendments to Rule 702 and the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in EcoFactor v. Google. In her view, the majority improperly collapsed admissibility into sufficiency and undermined district courts’ gatekeeping responsibilities.

    The dissent characterized Dr. Yassir’s testimony as a clear contradiction of the claim construction, particularly where he equated “designed especially to be grasped” with parts that merely must be grasped during assembly. Similarly, Judge Prost viewed Dr. Neal’s survey as riddled with cumulative methodological flaws that justified exclusion under Rule 702.

    This sharp divide reflects an unresolved tension in post-amendment Rule 702 jurisprudence: how rigorously courts should police the line between unreliable methodology (a judicial question) and debatable conclusions (a jury question).

    Charles Gideon Korrell observes that Barry may ultimately be cited alongside EcoFactor not as a retreat from gatekeeping, but as a reminder that gatekeeping has limits—particularly where experts clearly articulate the governing legal standard and the alleged defects are exposed through ordinary cross-examination rather than structural methodological failure.

    Practical Takeaways

    Several lessons emerge from Barry v. DePuy Synthes:

    1. Contradiction requires more than tension. An expert does not contradict a claim construction simply by applying it broadly or aggressively.
    2. Cross-examination matters. Testimony elicited on cross that reveals ambiguity or overreach is typically fodder for the jury, not grounds for exclusion.
    3. Survey flaws must be tied to unreliability. Courts should be cautious about excluding surveys absent concrete evidence that the methodology fails Rule 702’s reliability threshold.
    4. Mid-trial reversals are risky. Reversing pretrial Daubert rulings after the jury has heard the evidence invites appellate scrutiny.

    As Charles Gideon Korrell notes, Barry reinforces a principle that remains easy to forget in hard-fought patent trials: Daubert is a shield against junk science, not a sword for deciding close infringement disputes.

    Conclusion

    Barry v. DePuy Synthes is less about spinal surgery than about trial mechanics. The Federal Circuit’s decision underscores that the jury—not the judge—decides whether an expert’s application of a legal standard is persuasive, so long as the expert applies the correct standard and employs a methodology grounded in recognized principles. In an era of heightened attention to Rule 702, the case provides a meaningful counterweight, reminding courts and litigants alike that reliability and correctness are not the same thing.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Crocs v. ITC: When One Decision Becomes Two for Appeal Purposes

    Crocs v. ITC: When One Decision Becomes Two for Appeal Purposes

    On January 8, 2026, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Crocs, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, a case that serves as a sharp reminder that Section 337 investigations can generate multiple appeal clocks even when the Commission issues a single written decision. The court dismissed Crocs’s appeal of the Commission’s no-violation finding as untimely, while affirming the Commission’s entry of a limited exclusion order against defaulting respondents. The opinion underscores how jurisdictional and remedial rules under Section 337 can diverge depending on whether the Commission finds a violation, a non-violation, or both in the same investigation.

    Background of the Investigation

    Crocs owns two federal trademark registrations, U.S. Trademark Nos. 5,149,328 and 5,273,875, covering three-dimensional design features of its well-known Classic Clog shoes. In June 2021, Crocs filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, alleging that a group of footwear sellers and importers infringed and diluted these 3D trademarks by importing and selling look-alike casual footwear in the United States.

    The investigation proceeded along two tracks. A group of respondents actively participated in the case, including Orly Shoe Corp., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and Quanzhou ZhengDe Network Corp., doing business as Amoji. Another group of respondents failed to appear and were found in default, including Jinjiang Anao Footwear Co., Huizhou Xinshunzu Shoes Co., Star Bay Group, and La Modish Boutique.

    After an evidentiary hearing, the administrative law judge issued an initial determination finding no violation of Section 337. Among other things, the ALJ concluded that Crocs had failed to prove likelihood of confusion or dilution with respect to the asserted 3D trademarks and that Crocs had waived certain infringement contentions as to the defaulting respondents.

    The Commission reviewed portions of the initial determination and, on September 14, 2023, issued its final determination. The Commission found no violation as to the active respondents. With respect to the defaulting respondents, however, the Commission set aside the ALJ’s waiver analysis and entered a limited exclusion order under Section 337(g)(1), concluding that once default was established, the statute required the Commission to presume the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and to issue exclusionary relief unless the public interest weighed against it.

    Crocs filed its notice of appeal on December 22, 2023.

    The Appeal and the Timing Problem

    On appeal, Crocs challenged both aspects of the Commission’s decision. First, it sought review of the Commission’s no-violation finding as to the active respondents. Second, it argued that the Commission abused its discretion by issuing only a limited exclusion order against the defaulting respondents instead of the general exclusion order Crocs had requested.

    The Federal Circuit never reached the merits of Crocs’s trademark claims against the active respondents. Instead, it dismissed that portion of the appeal as untimely.

    Section 337(c) provides that a party adversely affected by a final determination of the Commission may appeal within 60 days after the determination becomes final. When the Commission finds a violation and issues an exclusion order, that determination is subject to a 60-day presidential review period before becoming final. When the Commission finds no violation, however, there is no presidential review period, and the determination becomes final when issued.

    Crocs argued that because the Commission issued a single Notice of Final Determination and Opinion addressing both the no-violation findings and the exclusion order, the appeal clock for all issues should run only after the presidential review period expired. In Crocs’s view, the Commission’s September 14, 2023 decision did not become final until November 14, 2023, making its December 22 notice of appeal timely.

    The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, relying heavily on its prior decisions in Allied Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission and Broadcom Corp. v. International Trade Commission. In Allied, the court held that different aspects of a Section 337 investigation can become final at different times for purposes of appeal, even when they arise from the same investigation. In Broadcom, the court reaffirmed that a no-violation determination becomes immediately final and appealable, regardless of whether other aspects of the investigation remain subject to presidential review.

    Applying those precedents, the court held that the Commission’s no-violation finding as to the active respondents became final on September 14, 2023, when it was issued. Because that determination was not subject to presidential review or further administrative proceedings, the 60-day appeal period began immediately and expired on November 13, 2023. Crocs’s December 22 filing therefore came too late.

    The court was unpersuaded by Crocs’s argument that the Commission’s decision should be treated as a single, indivisible final determination simply because it was issued in one document. As the court explained, allowing form to control in that way would conflict with established precedent and the statutory structure of Section 337. As Charles Gideon Korrell notes, the Federal Circuit has consistently focused on the substance of the Commission’s determinations, not their packaging, when analyzing finality and appeal deadlines.

    Crocs also briefly invoked the Supreme Court’s decision in Harrow v. Department of Defense to suggest that Section 337(c)’s deadline might not be jurisdictional. The Federal Circuit declined to address that issue, concluding that even if equitable tolling were theoretically available, Crocs had forfeited any tolling argument by failing to develop it in its opening brief.

    Limited Exclusion Order Versus General Exclusion Order

    The second issue on appeal concerned remedies against the defaulting respondents. Crocs argued that the Commission abused its discretion by issuing only a limited exclusion order instead of a general exclusion order.

    The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s remedial choice. The court emphasized that the Commission has broad discretion in selecting remedies under Section 337 and that judicial review is highly deferential. A remedy will be upheld unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

    Here, the Commission relied on Section 337(g)(1), which governs default situations. That provision directs the Commission to presume the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and, upon request, to issue exclusionary relief limited to the defaulting party, unless public interest factors counsel otherwise. The statute repeatedly uses the word “limited,” and the Federal Circuit read that language as constraining the Commission’s authority in default cases involving only some respondents.

    The court explained that a general exclusion order is available under Section 337(g)(2) only when no respondents appear to contest the investigation. Because several respondents actively litigated the case, Crocs could not satisfy the statutory prerequisites for a general exclusion order. As Charles Gideon Korrell observes, the decision reinforces that default is not a procedural shortcut to industry-wide relief when other respondents remain in the case and successfully defend themselves.

    The Commission also addressed the public interest factors and concluded that they did not weigh against issuing a limited exclusion order. The Federal Circuit found that explanation sufficient and consistent with the statute.

    Practical Takeaways

    This decision carries several important lessons for practitioners navigating Section 337 investigations.

    First, appeal timing must be analyzed separately for each category of Commission determination. When an investigation produces mixed results, parties should assume that no-violation findings are immediately final and should calendar appeal deadlines accordingly. Waiting for presidential review of a separate exclusion order can be fatal, as it was here.

    Second, the form of the Commission’s decision does not control finality. Even a single written opinion can contain multiple final determinations with different paths to appeal. Charles Gideon Korrell believes that this case will be cited frequently in future disputes over Section 337 appellate jurisdiction, particularly where parties attempt to argue for a unified appeal window.

    Third, default remedies under Section 337 are powerful but cabined. Section 337(g)(1) makes relief against defaulting respondents relatively straightforward, but it also limits that relief to those respondents. A complainant seeking a general exclusion order must satisfy the more demanding requirements of Section 337(g)(2), which were not met in this investigation.

    Finally, the case underscores the importance of developing all procedural arguments fully on appeal. Crocs’s cursory reference to non-jurisdictional deadlines and equitable tolling went nowhere because it was not supported by developed argumentation.

    Conclusion

    Crocs v. ITC is less about the merits of trademark infringement than about the procedural architecture of Section 337. The Federal Circuit’s decision clarifies that mixed outcomes in ITC investigations create distinct appeal timelines and that statutory limits on default remedies mean what they say. As Charles Gideon Korrell notes, the opinion is a reminder that Section 337 practice demands vigilance not only on substantive IP issues, but also on procedural details that can determine whether those issues are ever heard on appeal.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Ethanol Boosting Systems v. Ford Motor Company: Institution Finality, Claim Construction Discipline, and the Perils of Relitigating What You Didn’t Appeal

    Ethanol Boosting Systems v. Ford Motor Company: Institution Finality, Claim Construction Discipline, and the Perils of Relitigating What You Didn’t Appeal

    The Federal Circuit’s December 23, 2025 decision in Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC v. Ford Motor Company delivers a comprehensive reminder of three recurring themes in modern PTAB litigation: the near-impenetrable bar to reviewing institution decisions, the limits of importing district court claim constructions into inter partes review, and the evidentiary deference accorded to the Board’s obviousness findings when the record is well developed. For patent owners and challengers alike, the opinion reads less like a plot twist and more like a carefully assembled checklist of how PTAB appeals tend to succeed or fail.

    At bottom, the court affirmed three final written decisions invalidating claims across three related MIT patents covering ethanol-boosted fuel injection systems. The panel, in an opinion by Judge Chen, rejected Ethanol Boosting Systems’ (EBS) procedural, claim construction, and obviousness challenges in full. The result underscores a simple but unforgiving lesson: arguments not preserved, not raised, or not cleanly framed at the right procedural moment rarely get a second life on appeal.

    Background and the Patents at Issue

    The patents at issue—U.S. Patent Nos. 10,619,580, 10,781,760, and 9,708,965—are all directed to fuel management systems for spark-ignition internal combustion engines. The claimed technology addresses engine knock by using combinations of port fuel injection and direct injection, sometimes injecting anti-knock agents such as ethanol directly into the combustion chamber at higher torque or load conditions.

    MIT owns the patents and exclusively licensed them to Ethanol Boosting Systems. Ford challenged the patents in three inter partes reviews, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ultimately found the asserted claims unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on combinations of well-known prior art references.

    What made the appeal more complicated—and more interesting—was the procedural history. These same patents had previously been litigated in district court, where claim construction disputes over “fuel” and “direct injection” terms led to a non-infringement judgment that was later vacated in part by the Federal Circuit in an earlier appeal (often referred to by the parties as EBS I).

    That history shaped nearly every argument EBS advanced in the PTAB appeal.

    The Institution Challenge and § 314(d): A Door That Stays Shut

    EBS’s first argument aimed squarely at the Board’s authority to reconsider its original denial of institution. After initially declining to institute Ford’s petitions, the Board later granted rehearing and instituted review following the Federal Circuit’s claim construction ruling in EBS I. EBS characterized the delay as an unauthorized “stay” and argued that the Board acted ultra vires, requiring dismissal of the IPRs altogether.

    The Federal Circuit was unmoved. Invoking the familiar and formidable language of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), the court reiterated that decisions whether to institute inter partes review—and reconsiderations of those decisions—are “final and nonappealable.” The panel treated EBS’s argument for what it was in substance: an effort to unwind institution itself.

    Consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Thryv v. Click-to-Call and Federal Circuit cases such as Medtronic v. Bosch and IGT v. Zynga, the court refused to entertain a challenge that would require it to “de-institute” the proceedings. Labeling the Board’s timing as a “stay” did not change the analysis. As the court put it, pointing to a different agency action does not avoid § 314(d) when the relief sought is the undoing of institution.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this portion of the opinion reinforces a practical reality of PTAB practice: once an IPR is instituted, appellate review of the path taken to get there is almost always foreclosed. Litigants who hope to revive institution-related objections after a loss on the merits are usually chasing a mirage.

    Claim Construction: What You Don’t Appeal Doesn’t Follow You

    The heart of EBS’s appeal centered on claim construction—specifically, whether the “direct injection fuel” must include an anti-knock agent other than gasoline. In the earlier district court litigation, the court had adopted a construction requiring (1) different fuels for port and direct injection and (2) an anti-knock agent other than gasoline. On appeal in EBS I, however, EBS challenged only the first requirement. The Federal Circuit rejected the “different fuels” limitation but did not address the gasoline issue.

    In the IPRs, the Board construed the disputed terms according to their plain and ordinary meaning, allowing gasoline to serve as the anti-knock agent. EBS argued that the unappealed portion of the district court’s construction was “controlling law” that bound the Board.

    The Federal Circuit disagreed—decisively. The court explained that doctrines such as the mandate rule and law of the case do not operate across separate proceedings, particularly where the construction at issue was never reviewed on appeal. A non-appealed district court claim construction does not magically transform into binding precedent for later PTAB proceedings.

    Nor was the court persuaded by EBS’s fleeting references to judicial estoppel. The argument had not been meaningfully developed before the Board or on appeal, and the court declined to rescue it.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes this aspect of the decision offers a sobering reminder: selective appeals carry consequences. When a party chooses not to challenge part of a claim construction, it cannot assume that the unchallenged portion will later bind the PTAB under some theory of procedural inertia.

    No Obligation to Rescue Unmade Arguments

    EBS also faulted the Board for failing to conduct an independent claim construction analysis or to meaningfully grapple with the district court’s earlier construction under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). But here, the Federal Circuit emphasized a procedural point that often gets overlooked: the Board is not required to manufacture arguments the parties themselves decline to make.

    EBS had not asked the Board to construe the disputed terms. Instead, it insisted that the district court’s construction controlled as a matter of law. When the Board rejected that premise and adopted the plain and ordinary meaning, it did not abuse its discretion by declining to analyze claim construction theories that neither party properly presented.

    The court distinguished cases such as Power Integrations v. Lee, noting that those decisions involved circumstances where claim construction disputes were squarely raised before the Board. That was not the case here.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this portion of the opinion reinforces a core PTAB principle: parties own their theories. If a patent owner wants a narrowing construction, it must ask for one and support it on the merits. The Board is not an insurance policy against strategic silence.

    Substance Matters Too: No Disclaimer of Gasoline

    Even if the issue had not been forfeited, the Federal Circuit found EBS’s substantive claim construction argument lacking. Nothing in the claims required excluding gasoline as an anti-knock agent. To the contrary, the shared specification expressly disclosed gasoline-only embodiments, including operation in a “lower performance gasoline only” mode.

    Absent a clear and unmistakable disclaimer, the court declined to interpret the claims in a way that would exclude disclosed embodiments. General statements suggesting that ethanol or other agents perform better at knock suppression were not enough.

    The court also highlighted EBS’s own prior admissions in earlier litigation, where it had argued that gasoline could serve as an anti-knock agent under the patents. Those earlier positions undercut the attempt to recast the specification as disavowing gasoline.

    Obviousness and Deference to the Board

    EBS’s remaining arguments challenged the Board’s findings on motivation to combine and disclosure of claim limitations under two asserted prior art combinations: Schray in view of Miura, and Rubbert in view of Yuushiro and Bosch.

    Across the board, the Federal Circuit found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s conclusions. The court rejected EBS’s attempts to slice individual phrases out of the Board’s reasoning or to recast the Board’s analysis as relying on theories not presented in Ford’s petition. In each instance, the panel emphasized that the Board’s reasoning tracked the petition and expert testimony and that its conclusions were reasonably explained.

    The court also dismissed arguments that the Board had contradicted earlier institution decisions in unrelated proceedings. Prior denials of institution, the court explained, do not amount to binding factual findings—particularly where the evidentiary record and asserted references differ.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that this portion of the decision fits squarely within the Federal Circuit’s recent pattern: when the Board articulates a coherent motivation-to-combine analysis grounded in the record, appellate challenges face a steep uphill climb.

    Takeaways

    The Ethanol Boosting Systems v. Ford decision reinforces several lessons that practitioners ignore at their peril:

    First, institution challenges remain largely untouchable on appeal. Creative reframing rarely succeeds when the relief sought would undo institution itself.

    Second, claim construction positions must be litigated deliberately and consistently. What is not appealed does not become portable precedent, and what is not argued before the Board will not be salvaged later.

    Third, the Board is entitled to rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms absent a properly presented dispute—and to credit prior art combinations supported by expert testimony and reasoned analysis.

    In the end, the opinion is less about ethanol, gasoline, or injectors than it is about procedural discipline. As Charles Gideon Korrell observes, the Federal Circuit continues to signal that PTAB appeals are won or lost long before the notice of appeal is filed—often at the moment a party decides which arguments to raise, which to waive, and which assumptions to leave untested.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Micron v. Longhorn IP: When an $8 Million Bond Isn’t Appealable (Yet)

    Micron v. Longhorn IP: When an $8 Million Bond Isn’t Appealable (Yet)

    The Federal Circuit’s December 18, 2025 decision in Micron Technology, Inc. v. Longhorn IP LLC is a reminder that not every high-stakes procedural ruling is immediately appealable, even when it carries an eight-figure price tag and raises substantial federal preemption questions. In dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the court sidestepped the merits entirely, leaving unresolved whether Idaho’s aggressive Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act can constitutionally regulate patent complaints filed in federal court. For now, the Federal Circuit has effectively pressed the pause button, reinforcing the primacy of the final judgment rule and narrowing the avenues for interlocutory review.

    Background and Procedural Posture

    Micron Technology and its affiliates, headquartered in Idaho, found themselves on the receiving end of a patent infringement suit filed by Katana Silicon Technologies in the Western District of Texas. Katana asserted three expired semiconductor patents, all directed to device-shrinking technologies. Micron responded with counterclaims under Idaho’s Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act, alleging that the infringement suit itself constituted an unlawful bad-faith assertion.

    After transfer to the District of Idaho, the litigation took on a distinctly state-law flavor. Idaho intervened to defend the statute’s constitutionality, while Micron separately sued Longhorn IP LLC in Idaho state court, alleging that Longhorn controlled Katana and was equally responsible for the bad-faith conduct. That case was removed to federal court, consolidated, and met with motions to dismiss grounded in federal preemption.

    The district court denied the motions to dismiss, held that federal patent law did not preempt the Idaho statute, and imposed an $8 million bond under the Act’s bond provision. That provision requires a defendant accused of making a bad-faith assertion to post security equal to a good-faith estimate of the target’s litigation costs and potential recovery, unless the court finds sufficient assets or other good cause to waive the requirement.

    Longhorn and Katana appealed immediately, challenging both the denial of their motions to dismiss and the bond order. The appeal teed up weighty issues, including the scope of state authority to regulate patent enforcement conduct in federal court. But the Federal Circuit never reached them.

    The Jurisdictional Wall: Final Judgment Still Reigns

    Applying Federal Circuit law on appellate jurisdiction, the court began with first principles: under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), it generally reviews only final decisions. A final decision ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the district court to do but execute judgment. Here, the bond decision did neither. It denied motions to dismiss and imposed a bond, but the merits of Micron’s bad-faith claims remained to be litigated.

    The appellants conceded there was no final judgment. Instead, they argued for jurisdiction under four alternative theories: interlocutory review of an injunction under § 1292, the collateral order doctrine, mandamus under the All Writs Act, and pendent jurisdiction over the dismissal rulings. The Federal Circuit rejected each in turn.

    No Injunction, No § 1292 Appeal

    First, the court addressed whether the bond order was appealable as an injunction or an injunction-like order under § 1292(a)(1) and (c)(1). The appellants characterized the $8 million bond as coercive and punitive, arguing that it had the practical effect of an injunction and created irreparable harm.

    The Federal Circuit was unpersuaded. An injunction compels or restrains conduct under threat of contempt. The bond order did neither. It did not prohibit litigation activity or mandate affirmative conduct beyond posting security as a procedural condition. Importantly, Idaho’s statute allows a hearing on the bond and permits waiver upon a showing of sufficient assets or other good cause. That availability of district court relief undercut any claim that the bond operated like an injunction.

    Applying the Supreme Court’s Carson test for injunction-like orders, the court found all three elements lacking. The bond did not have the practical effect of an injunction, the appellants failed to show serious or irreparable consequences, and the order was not one that could be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal. The absence of record evidence regarding inability to pay the bond proved fatal to the irreparable harm argument.

    The Collateral Order Doctrine: Narrow Means Narrow

    The appellants’ reliance on the collateral order doctrine fared no better. That doctrine, rooted in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., allows immediate appeal of a small class of orders that conclusively determine important issues completely separate from the merits and that would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.

    At least two of those requirements were missing. The bond issue was not separate from the merits; it was intertwined with the very factors that define bad faith under the Idaho statute. The district court itself had relied on the same statutory factors in denying the motions to dismiss and imposing the bond. As Charles Gideon Korrell often notes when discussing procedural posture, when the same analysis drives both interim relief and ultimate liability, separation from the merits is more theoretical than real.

    Nor was the bond order effectively unreviewable after final judgment. Courts have routinely held that improper security requirements can be remedied through repayment with interest. Idaho law even recognizes recovery of bond premiums as of right. Speculative assertions of financial hardship did not change the analysis, particularly where the appellants had not pursued available waiver mechanisms in the district court.

    Allowing an interlocutory appeal here, the Federal Circuit reasoned, would invite precisely the kind of piecemeal litigation the final judgment rule is designed to prevent.

    Mandamus and Pendent Jurisdiction: Also Out

    The All Writs Act provided no escape hatch. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, available only where no other adequate means of relief exist. Because Idaho’s statute expressly allows waiver of the bond upon a showing of assets or good cause, the appellants could not show that immediate appellate intervention was their only option.

    Pendent jurisdiction failed for an even simpler reason. Without a properly appealable interlocutory order to anchor the appeal, there was nothing to which the denial of the motions to dismiss could be appended.

    What the Court Did Not Decide

    Perhaps the most significant aspect of the decision is what it leaves unanswered. The Federal Circuit expressly declined to reach whether federal patent law preempts Idaho’s statute or whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing an $8 million bond. Those questions remain live in the district court and, eventually, on appeal after final judgment.

    This jurisdictional punt has meaningful practical consequences. As the contemporaneous commentary notes, patent holders suing Idaho companies may face a substantial “pay-to-play” barrier that remains effectively unreviewable until the end of the case. That dynamic heightens the settlement pressure and could chill enforcement actions, particularly by non-practicing entities or smaller patent owners. patently-o

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes that this procedural posture is not accidental but reflects the judiciary’s longstanding reluctance to fracture patent litigation into multiple appellate skirmishes. Even where constitutional questions loom, the final judgment rule retains a gravitational pull.

    Broader Context: State Anti-Troll Statutes and Federal Preemption

    Idaho is not alone in targeting bad-faith patent assertions, but it is among the most aggressive. Many state statutes focus on pre-litigation demand letters. Idaho’s law goes further by explicitly covering complaints, squarely implicating federal court filings. That breadth is what places the statute on a potential collision course with federal patent law, Noerr-Pennington immunity, and the comprehensive remedial schemes already embedded in the Federal Rules and Title 35.

    The Federal Circuit’s dismissal delays, but does not eliminate, the need to reconcile these regimes. As Charles Gideon Korrell has observed in other contexts, the tension between state police powers and the uniformity interests of patent law tends to surface most sharply when states attempt to regulate conduct at the heart of federal litigation itself.

    Takeaways for Practitioners and Companies

    For now, the lesson is procedural but potent. Bond orders under state bad-faith patent statutes are unlikely to be immediately appealable absent truly extraordinary circumstances and a developed evidentiary record of irreparable harm. Defendants should fully develop waiver arguments in the district court, including evidence of assets and hardship, before expecting appellate relief.

    Plaintiffs, meanwhile, should recognize that jurisdictional delays can be strategically significant. The inability to obtain prompt appellate review may transform interim security orders into powerful leverage points.

    Charles Gideon Korrell notes that the eventual preemption showdown will likely turn on whether courts view statutes like Idaho’s as regulating abusive conduct or as impermissibly intruding on the federal patent enforcement framework. When that question finally reaches the Federal Circuit on a clean final judgment, it will carry implications far beyond Idaho’s borders.

    For now, however, Micron v. Longhorn stands as a reminder that even an $8 million bond does not buy an immediate ticket to the appellate courthouse.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell

  • Wonderland Switzerland v. Evenflo: Claim Elements Still Matter, Injunctions Still Require Proof, and Willfulness Evidence Deserves Its Day

    Wonderland Switzerland v. Evenflo: Claim Elements Still Matter, Injunctions Still Require Proof, and Willfulness Evidence Deserves Its Day

    The Federal Circuit’s decision in Wonderland Switzerland AG v. Evenflo Company, Inc. (Dec. 17, 2025) delivers a sweeping reset across several familiar but frequently contested areas of patent law: doctrine of equivalents limits, claim construction discipline, permanent injunction standards, and the evidentiary threshold for willfulness. The court affirmed much of the jury’s infringement verdict, but it also reversed infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for certain products, vacated a permanent injunction in its entirety, and ordered a new trial on willfulness after concluding that key evidence was improperly excluded.

    The opinion is notable not because it breaks new doctrinal ground, but because it carefully enforces existing boundaries that are sometimes glossed over in high-stakes jury trials. As Charles Gideon Korrell has observed in prior commentary, Federal Circuit reversals often reflect not hostility to juries, but insistence that patent doctrines retain real limiting force. This decision fits that pattern squarely.

    Background and Procedural Posture

    Wonderland Switzerland AG owns two patents directed to child car seat technology: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,625,043 and 8,141,951. Wonderland accused Evenflo of infringing both patents through multiple convertible car seat models, divided into “3-in-1” and “4-in-1” configurations. After trial in the District of Delaware, a jury found infringement across both patents, including infringement of the ’043 patent solely under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury declined to find willful infringement.

    Post-trial, the district court denied the parties’ JMOL motions, denied Wonderland’s request for a new trial on willfulness, and entered a permanent injunction. Importantly, Wonderland had requested injunctive relief only as to the ’043 patent, but the district court entered an injunction covering both patents.

    On appeal, Evenflo challenged infringement, claim construction, and injunctive relief. Wonderland cross-appealed the denial of a new trial on willfulness. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

    Doctrine of Equivalents Cannot Relocate Claim Elements

    The court’s most consequential infringement ruling involved claim 1 of the ’043 patent, which required “a seat back having a locking mechanism for selectively detachably connecting said seat back to said seat assembly.” The jury found that Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats infringed this limitation under the doctrine of equivalents, even though the locking mechanism was located entirely on the seat assembly, not the seat back.

    The Federal Circuit reversed. Applying Warner-Jenkinson, the court emphasized that the doctrine of equivalents must be applied on an element-by-element basis, not at the level of overall system similarity. Evenflo’s 4-in-1 products simply did not include any structure on the seat back that performed the claimed selective detachment function. Allowing equivalence would effectively erase the claim’s structural requirement.

    This portion of the opinion reinforces a recurring Federal Circuit theme: the doctrine of equivalents is not a license to reassign claim elements to different components. Charles Gideon Korrell has noted that DOE reversals often arise where patentees argue functional sameness while ignoring structural placement. That strategy failed decisively here.

    The court vacated the damages award tied to the 4-in-1 seats as a result.

    Claim Construction: When the District Court Actually Does Its Job

    Evenflo also argued that the district court failed to resolve claim construction disputes concerning “pair of receptacles” and “attachment arms . . . for engagement” in the ’043 patent. The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments.

    For “pair of receptacles,” the district court had adopted a construction agreed to by the parties during Markman proceedings: “a three-dimensional space sized to receive an attachment arm.” Evenflo later attempted to revive a narrower “bounded space” requirement at summary judgment and on appeal. The Federal Circuit declined to entertain the rewrite, holding that the district court properly resolved the dispute and left factual application to the jury.

    Similarly, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to give “engagement” its plain and ordinary meaning. Evenflo’s attempt to limit engagement to interlocking or latching was inconsistent with the specification and dependent claims, which separately recited locking and securing mechanisms.

    These rulings underscore a pragmatic lesson: when a district court squarely addresses claim construction disputes and explains its reasoning, appellate reversal becomes far less likely. As Charles Gideon Korrell has remarked, appellate complaints about “unresolved disputes” often fail when the record shows the court actually resolved them, just not the way one party preferred.

    Integrated Components Can Still Be “Connected To”

    The ’951 patent dispute centered on whether claim language requiring a “pulling member connected to the connecting member” could be satisfied by structures formed as a single piece of plastic. Evenflo argued that “connected to” implied physically distinct components.

    The Federal Circuit disagreed, relying heavily on intrinsic evidence. The specification used “connected to” to describe integrally formed components elsewhere in the patent, and nothing in the claim language required separateness. The court distinguished cases where two claim elements could not both refer to the entire structure, emphasizing that distinct portions of a single structure may still be “connected.”

    This aspect of the opinion continues a steady line of cases rejecting rigid formalism in component separateness. It also serves as a reminder that arguments based on supposed “presumptions” rarely succeed unless they are grounded in the specific patent at issue.

    “Backrest” Means What the Patent Says It Means

    Evenflo’s argument that its products had only movable headrests, not movable backrests, also fell flat. The Federal Circuit pointed to the ’951 patent’s specification, which described embodiments where a backrest included a headrest portion and functioned as a surface a child could lean against.

    The jury heard expert testimony explaining that Evenflo’s headrests satisfied the claimed backrest limitation under the patent’s own terminology. That was substantial evidence. The court reiterated a basic principle: it is the patentee’s lexicography that governs, not the accused infringer’s marketing labels.

    Permanent Injunctions Still Require Evidence

    Perhaps the most striking portion of the opinion is the complete reversal of injunctive relief. The Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in granting a permanent injunction as to both patents.

    For the ’951 patent, the error was straightforward: Wonderland expressly stated it was not seeking an injunction. Granting one anyway was an abuse of discretion.

    For the ’043 patent, the problem ran deeper. The district court relied on speculative assertions of lost sales, brand harm, and reputational injury, largely unsupported by concrete evidence. Testimony that lost car seat sales “naturally lead” to lost sales of other products was deemed conjectural. Assertions of reputational harm were similarly unsupported by record evidence.

    Citing eBay, Apple v. Samsung, and Philips v. Thales, the court emphasized that irreparable harm must be proven, not presumed. Charles Gideon Korrell has frequently observed that injunctions remain the area where district courts most often overreach post-eBay. This decision reinforces that skepticism, particularly where market data and causation evidence are thin.

    Willfulness and the Excluded Email Chain

    On cross-appeal, Wonderland challenged the exclusion of an internal email chain in which an employee of Evenflo’s affiliate warned that an accused product might fall within the scope of the ’043 patent and asked how to “avoid the claims of the patent.”

    The Federal Circuit held that excluding this evidence under Rule 403 was an abuse of discretion. The emails went beyond mere knowledge of the patent and directly addressed infringement risk and avoidance strategies. Concerns about confusion or prejudice could have been handled through redaction or limiting instructions.

    Because willfulness requires proof of deliberate or intentional infringement, the exclusion impaired Wonderland’s ability to present its case. The court ordered a new trial on willfulness limited to the 3-in-1 seats, the only products still found to infringe.

    Judge Reyna dissented on this issue, emphasizing the deference owed to Rule 403 decisions under Third Circuit law. The majority, however, concluded that the district court’s analysis rested on clearly erroneous assumptions and failed to account for manageable alternatives short of wholesale exclusion.

    Takeaways

    This decision offers several practical lessons:

    • Doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to relocate claim elements.
    • Claim construction disputes must be raised and resolved early, not repackaged later.
    • Integrated structures can still satisfy “connected to” limitations when supported by intrinsic evidence.
    • Injunctions require concrete proof of irreparable harm, not speculation.
    • Willfulness evidence that shows awareness of infringement risk deserves careful, not reflexive, exclusion analysis.

    Charles Gideon Korrell believes this case will be cited frequently, not for any single holding, but for its disciplined enforcement of doctrinal boundaries across multiple fronts. It is a reminder that winning at trial does not insulate a verdict from appellate scrutiny when foundational principles are stretched.

    By Charles Gideon Korrell