In Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corp. v. Unified Patents, LLC, No. 23-2110 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2025), the Federal Circuit dismissed Dolby’s appeal for lack of Article III standing. Although Dolby had prevailed before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in an inter partes review (IPR) initiated by Unified Patents, it sought to appeal the Board’s refusal to adjudicate a dispute over the petition’s Real Party in Interest (RPI) disclosure. The Federal Circuit held that none of Dolby’s asserted injuries established the “concrete and particularized” harm necessary to create a justiciable controversy.
Background
Unified Patents filed an IPR challenging claims 1, 7, and 8 of Dolby’s U.S. Patent No. 10,237,577. Dolby alleged that Unified improperly failed to disclose nine additional RPIs. The Board declined to resolve the RPI dispute, citing PTAB precedent (SharkNinja v. iRobot IPR proceeding, IPR2020-00734) and USPTO policy limiting such adjudications to when the outcome of the proceeding might be affected (e.g., due to time bar or estoppel).
Charles Gideon Korrell notes that the PTAB ultimately found in favor of Dolby, upholding the challenged claims. Nonetheless, Dolby appealed, asserting that the Board’s refusal to decide the RPI issue caused it harm.
No Standing Despite Statutory “Right to Appeal”
Dolby first argued that it had standing based on 35 U.S.C. § 319, which provides a right of appeal to any “party dissatisfied” with a PTAB final written decision. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, reiterating its longstanding view that statutory appeal rights under the America Invents Act (AIA) do not override the constitutional requirement of Article III standing (JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive, 898 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
No Informational Injury Under § 312(a)(2)
Dolby also contended that the failure to adjudicate the RPI issue violated its informational rights under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), which requires IPR petitions to identify all RPIs. The court disagreed, distinguishing this situation from the “public-disclosure” statutes found in Public Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) and FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). Unlike the statutes at issue in those cases, the AIA does not grant a general right of public access to RPI information, nor does it create a statutory cause of action to vindicate such a right. Furthermore, Charles Gideon Korrell notes, decisions regarding institution—including compliance with § 312(a)(2)—are explicitly made non-appealable under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (ESIP Series 2, LLC v. Puzhen Life USA, 958 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).
Speculative Harms Do Not Establish Injury in Fact
The remainder of Dolby’s arguments were similarly dismissed as speculative. The court found no credible evidence that:
- Any of the alleged RPIs were violating Dolby license agreements (Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 992 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021));
- The administrative patent judges (APJs) had conflicts of interest;
- Future estoppel rights would be compromised; or
- Unified would alter its behavior if RPIs had to be disclosed.
Without evidence of actual or imminent harm, the court held that Dolby failed to meet its burden under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016).
Key Takeaways
- Statutory appeal rights under the AIA do not eliminate the requirement of Article III standing.
- The Federal Circuit continues to take a narrow view of informational injuries, especially in the context of administrative patent proceedings.
- Speculative future harms and procedural disagreements—without more—are not enough to sustain federal appellate jurisdiction.
Charles Gideon Korrell sees this case serving as a reminder that even victorious IPR patent owners must demonstrate a cognizable injury to pursue appeals based on procedural grievances.
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